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THE USE OF HYPNOSIS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: THE
BLACK LETTER OF THE BLACK ART
[T]here are few dangers so great in the search for truth as man's
propensity to tamper with the memory of others.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Hypnosis has attracted the attention of psychoanalysts, scientists
and lay persons alike, with the premise that it is a way to tap the uncon-
scious mind, and thereby obtain "the truth."2 In the past few decades,
the forensic use of hypnosis has gained popularity in the legal world; in
its quest for truth and justice, the legal system has come to solicit the
powers of the black art.3 However, as the use of hypnosis expands into
2. But see 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA Hypnosis 137 (1974) ("It remains controver-
sial whether hypnotic suggestions can improve memory effectively.... The popular opinion
that hypnosis facilitates recollection has not been supported by adequately controlled subse-
quent research.").,
3. "The practice of hypnotism.., is about as old as human history and is nearly as wide-
spread as the race itself." Ladd, Legal Aspects of Hypnotism, 11 YALE L.J. 173, 174 (1902).
The power of suggestion dates back to the cunning serpent who overpowered Adam and Eve in
the Garden of Eden. Genesis 3:1-6. Hypnosis came to be considered a ritualistic practice used
to unnaturally control the forces of nature and was often associated with the occult.
"[H]ypnosis is connected with sooth-saying, magic, healing by laying on of hands, and various
forms of witchcraft and priestcraft." Ladd, supra, at 174. This "magic" was referred to as
"black" after the rise of Christianity. 4 ENCYCLOPAEDIA AMERICANA Black Art 32 (1958).
The use of hypnosis has been popularized as a mysterious force which allows the hypnotist to
exercise control over the minds and wills of others. "Who can forget the classic films with
John Barrymore as Svengali controlling the helpless Trilby, or Bela Lugosi as Dracula peering
into the eyes of his enchanted victims, or Orson Wells as Cagliostro, using mesmerism to steal
the diamond necklace which would topple the throne of France." State v. Contreras, 674 P.2d
792, 802 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 718 P.2d 129 (1986). As hypnosis found a place in the
legal realm, even the courts recognize it as "one of the dark arts." People v. Hughes, 59
N.Y.2d 523, 533, 453 N.E.2d 484, 488, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255, 259 (1983).
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the courtroom, a question arises as to which party is mesmerized-the
hypnotized subject or the trier of fact.
Hypnosis has been of scientific and psychological interest primarily
for purposes of breaking down barriers to a subject's memory when recall
is blocked due to a traumatic or emotionally charged event.4 It is pre-
cisely this potential "remembering" of events previously perceived that
created an interest in the forensic use of hypnosis, leading to an increased
use of hypnosis as a means of refreshing memory.5 Hypnosis is undoubt-
edly helpful as an investigative tool. Many police departments use hyp-
nosis as a means of obtaining leads in seemingly fruitless investigations.
Often, these leads successfully result in-the discovery of reliable in-
dependent physical evidence.6 When investigating a crime, the goal of
4. M. ORNE, D. SOSKIS, D. DINGES, E. ORNE & M. TONRY, HYPNOTICALLY RE-
FRESHED TESTIMONY: ENHANCING MEMORY OR TAMPERING WITH EvIDENCE? 14 (1985)
[hereinafter HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY]. Two techniques are used to refresh
memory through hypnosis: hypnotic age regression and hypnotically suggested increased re-
call. Council on Scientific Affairs, Scientific Status of Refreshing Recollection by the Use of
Hypnosis, 253 J. A.M.A. 1918, 1919 (1985). The former is most commonly used in psycho-
therapy to reexperience a forgotten traumatic event. Id.; M. ORNE, D. DINGES & E. ORNE,
THE FORENSIC USE OF HYPNOSIS 3 (1984) [hereinafter THE FORENSIC USE OF HYPNOSIS].
The procedure of hypnotically suggested increased recall is often used to refresh the memory
of a witness or victim. This is referred to as the "television technique" since it suggests to the
subject that he or she is able to play back the event in question as-if watching a documentary,
permitting the subject to freeze the action, zoom in for a close-up or replay certain segments
for a closer look. THE FORSENSIC USE OF HYPNOSIS, supra, at 4; see also Council on Scientific
Affairs, supra, at 1919. "The assumption, however, that a process analogous to a multichannel
videotape recorder inside the head records all sensory impressions and stores them in their
pristine form indefinitely is not consistent with research findings or with current theories of
memory." Council on Scientific Affairs, supra, at 1920.
5. The validity of hypnosis as a means of improving memory, however, is the subject of
controversy:
Review of the scientific literature indicates that when hypnosis is used to refresh
recollection, one of the following outcomes occurs: (1) hypnosis produces recollec-
tions that are not substantially different from nonhypnotic recollections; (2) it yields
recollections that are more inaccurate than nonhypnotic memory; or, most fre-
quently, (3) it results in more information being reported, but these recollections
contain both accurate and inaccurate details .... There are no data to support a
fourth alternative, namely, that hypnosis increases remembering of only accurate in-
formation.
Contrary to what is generally believed by the public, recollections obtained dur-
ing hypnosis not only fail to be more accurate but actually appear to be generally less
reliable than nonhypnotic recall .... The scientific literature indicates that hypnosis
can increase inaccurate response to leading questions without a change in confidence,
or it can increase the subject's confidence in his memories without affecting accuracy,
or it can increase errors while also falsely increasing confidence. In no study to date
has there been an increase in accuracy associated with an appropriate increase in
confidence in the veracity of recollections.
Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 4, at 1921, quoted in part with approval in Rock v.
Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2713 n.18 (1987).
6. One of the most notable cases involving the use of hypnosis to obtain leads in a crimi-
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hypnotizing a witness is to obtain information leading to the discovery of
concrete evidence. 7 In such investigations, the subject's ability or inab-
lility to accurately recall information is of no constitutional concern.
When the previously hypnotized witness offers testimony in a criminal
trial, however, a witness' ability to accurately recall is crucial. Any ill
effects of hypnosis inject the danger that a conviction will be based on
potentially unreliable evidence.
While the use of hypnosis can potentially refresh the subject's mem-
ory, it may also alter that memory. Thus, doubt is cast on the trustwor-
thiness of hypnosis used for the purpose of enhancing8 the memory of a
witness, victim or defendant in preparation for testifying in a criminal
trial. Recognizing that hypnosis may, in some cases, be necessary for
discovering "the truth," as well as the potential danger of inaccurate re-
call through the use of hypnosis, courts have yet to resolve the question
of the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony in a criminal
trial.
This Comment will set forth the dangers that are inherent in the use
of hypnosis, specifically considering the ramifications of its use on a sub-
ject who seeks to have his or her memory refreshed in anticipation of
offering testimony at a criminal trial. Next, this Comment will critically
examine how state and federal courts have treated the issue of hypnosis,
considering the underlying rationale for their decision to exclude or ad-
mit hypnotically refreshed testimony as well as the viability of their theo-
ries in light of the rules of evidence. This Comment will propose
additional methods of evaluating the reliability of such testimony that are
nal investigation was the recollection of the license plate number in the Chowchilla kidnapping
case. See Kroger & Douce, Hypnosis in Criminal Investigation, 27 INT'L J. OF CLINICAL &
EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 358 (1979) for a discussion of the use of hypnosis in that investiga-
tion. See generally Ault, Jr., FBI Guidelines for Use of Hypnosis, 27 INT'L J. OF CLINICAL &
EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 449, 451 (1979) ("The FBI does not intend that hypnosis be used
as anything other than a 'tool' in the investigator's repertoire. It is not intended to be a 'hurry-
up' substitute for proper investigation and proven investigative techniques.").
7. "The use of hypnosis in an investigative context, with the sole purpose being to obtain
leads, is clearly the area where hypnotic techniques are most appropriately employed." Ome,
The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS
311, 327 (1979).
8. For purposes of this Comment, the terms "refresh" and "enhance" will be used synon-
ymously with reference to the effect of hypnosis on a subject's memory or recollection and his
or her subsequent testimony at trial. The term "refreshed" suggests that the hypnotic proce-
dure will bring to consciousness that which was always in the subconscious. "Enhanced"
leaves open the possibility that a subject's memory has been altered by the addition of informa-
tion gathered during the hypnotic session, whether it be something simply forgotten or some-
thing that was never perceived. However, unless explicitly noted that the subject's
posthypnotic memory contains untruths, the terms will be used generically to refer to an in-
creased memory as a result of hypnosis.
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in accordance with the rules of evidence. The following section of this
Comment will be devoted to exploring the unique constitutional issues
which arise when hypnotically enhanced testimony is presented in a
criminal trial. This discussion will address both the prosecution's use of
such testimony and the use of hypnosis by a criminal defendant in light
of the United States Supreme Court's recent holding in Rock v. Arkan-
sas.9 The Comment will conclude by considering the future use of hyp-
nosis in criminal trials, focusing on the influence of Rock.
II. THE DANGERS OF HYPNOSIS
First, it is essential to strip away the cloak of mystery surrounding
the use of hypnosis and examine its "powers" rationally.1" Hypnosis is
characterized as a sleep-like state in which the subject is able to concen-
trate deeply on a suggested topic, excluding peripheral stimuli from con-
sciousness."' While experts in the field disagree on the reliability of
hypnosis in the legal setting, the potential dangers of the procedure are
generally recognized. 2 Three dangers may cast doubt on the reliability
of hypnotically refreshed memory: suggestibility, confabulation and
overconfidence. The possible effects of these dangers are of critical con-
cern when the witness is preparing to testify to his or her enhanced
"memory" at a criminal trial, where a witness' statements may determine
the guilt or innocence of the accused.
A. Suggestibility
While under the power of hypnosis, the subject is in an extremely
relaxed state and becomes susceptible to both verbal and nonverbal sug-
gestions.' 3 Such innocuous details as the tone of voice of the hypnotist,
9. 107 S. Ct. 2704.
10. "When we objectively examine the literature, hypnotism becomes far more prosaic and
loses its aura of mystery and legerdemain." State v. Contreras, 674 P.2d 792, 802 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1983), rev'd, 718 P.2d 129 (Alaska 1986).
11. 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA Hypnosis 133 (1974); cf Council on Scientific Affairs,
supra note 4, at 1919 ("There is no single, generally accepted theory of hypnosis, nor is there
consensus about a single definition. Despite some controversy on technical points among ex-
perts, most authorities agree that hypnosis requires at least superficial cooperation of the sub-
ject, the development of rapport, and the subject's focusing of attention."). For an account of
the history of hypnosis, see 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA Hypnosis 133, 134-35 (1974).
12. See generally HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY, supra note 4, at 5-27; Dia-
mond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CALIF. L.
REV. 313, 332-42 (1980); 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITTANICA Hypnosis 137-40 (1974). See Rock
v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2713 (1987), where the United States Supreme Court acknowl-
edged the dangers of suggestibility, confabulation and "memory hardening" inherent in the use
of hypnosis.
13. Suggestion is defined as "the act or process of impressing something... upon the mind
January 1988]
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the clothes the hypnotist is wearing, the phrasing of the questions 14 or
the environment in which the session is conducted have all been found to
influence the answers given by a hypnotized subject.' 5 "[B]ecause an in-
dividual is typically more compliant in accepting suggestions from the
hypnotist, less critical in evaluating the suggestions that are given, and
more responsive to experiencing suggested events in hypnosis, pre-ex-
isting memories may more easily be altered by subtle and often unwitting
implicit suggestions."' 6 After the subject comes out of the hypnotic
trance, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the hypnotist or the subject to
differentiate between fact and suggested detail.' 7
The danger of suggestibility is even more pronounced when hypno-
sis is used in anticipation of the subject testifying at a criminal trial.
Hypnosis is often used by law enforcement officials on victims or wit-
nesses when little concrete evidence is available and the subject is willing
to cooperate."8 This willingness to cooperate and the suggestibility inher-
ent in any hypnotic session is precisely what can make the fruits of the
procedure unreliable. Even with the most stringent safeguatds and pre-
of another" and "a means or process of influencing attitudes and behavior hypnotically."
WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2286 (3d ed. 1966).
14. Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 4, at 1922. Studies have shown that hypno-
tized subjects make significantly more errors in response to leading questions and are more apt
to report as actual memories information that was merely suggested through leading questions.
See generally Putnam, Hypnosis and Distortions in Eyewitness Memory, 27 INT'L J. OF
CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 437 (1979); Saunders & Simmons, Use of Hypnosis to
Enhance Eyewitness Accuracy: Does it Work?, 68 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 70 (1983); Zelig
& Beidleman, The Investigative Use of Hypnosis: A Word of Caution, 29 INT'L J. OF CLINICAL
& EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 401 (1981).
15. The subject may also be influenced by posthypnotic suggestions, that is, "[s]uggestions
given to the individual during hypnosis which are to take effect subsequently, when the subject
is no longer hypnotized ... " HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY, supra note 4, at
glossary.
State v. Joblin, 107 Idaho 351, 689 P.2d 767 (1984), provides an extreme example of
posthypnotic suggestion. In Joblin, a witness to a murder was able to give only a general
physical description of the assailant. Id. at 352, 689 P.2d at 768. A few months after the
murder, the witness was hypnotized by a police officer, but was still unable to make a photo-
graphic identification of the murderer. Id. The witness had been given a posthypnotic sugges-
tion to the effect that he would be able to get a clearer and clearer picture of the assailant. Two
years later, after the witness had learned that the Joblin brothers were suspects in the crime,
the witness made a highly confident statement identifying the defendant. Id. at 353, 689 P.2d
at 769. The witness was then able to identify the defendant in a highly suggestive line-up. The
trial court ruled that the hypnosis had improperly influenced the witness' memory and ex-
cluded the identification testimony of the witness. Id. This ruling was affirmed as being prop-
erly within the trial court's discretion. Id. at 354, 689 P.2d at 770.
16. HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY, supra note 4, at 24.
17. Diamond, supra note 12, at 314; Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 4, at 1922.
18. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 184, 644 P.2d 1266, 1270 (1982),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Nunez, 135 Ariz. 257, 660 P.2d 858 (1983).
January 1988] HYPNOSIS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
cautions, the danger is always present that the hypnotist may be respon-
sible for suggesting the "facts" that the subject is able to remember.' 9
This danger is compounded when the hypnotist has an interest in the
investigation. Law enforcement agencies often instruct their officers how
to use hypnosis to aid in their investigations. However, when the law
enforcement agency or a hypnotist hired by that agency conducts the
hypnotic session, a danger exists that their inherent bias will be con-
veyed, consciously or unconsciously, through the hypnotist to the sub-
ject.2" The likely suggestion of the hypnotist in such cases may be
sufficient to deem the fruits of the hypnosis irreparably tainted.2
19. See infra text accompanying notes 59-70 for a discussion of the use of safeguards.
20. For instance, a law enforcement official may hypnotize a forgetful victim or eyewitness
in hopes of obtaining a physical description of the assailant. The police may already have a
suspect to the crime and are trying to ascertain whether this suspect fits the witness' descrip-
tion. If the hypnotized witness does not voluntarily provide a sufficient physical description,
the hypnotist may ask more pointed questions regarding the assailant's characteristics. If the
police have a suspect at the time of the hypnotic session, the questions may be, deliberately or
unwittingly, tempered with certain physical characteristics of that suspect. The hypnotized
witness will be prone to the suggestions given and may actually supply a description in accord-
ance with those suggestions, thereby describing the suspect, regardless of how the witness actu-
ally perceived the assailant. See Orne, supra note 7, at 327-28, where the author discusses the
use of hypnosis in an investigative setting, drawing distinctions between situations in which no
concrete facts are available, when significant facts are known prior to hypnosis and when the
witness has made conflicting statements.
These potential biases illustrate the need for the hypnotic session to be conducted by a
neutral and detached party. The hypnotist should know little about the investigation to mini-
mize conveying biases to the vulnerable subject during the hypnotic suggestion. However, this
safeguard is not always followed. The agency investigating or prosecuting the crime often
conducts the hypnotic session, thereby creating a danger that the subject's memory will be
influenced by the biases of the agency.
21. Although recognized as an acceptable investigative tool, the use of hypnosis becomes
suspect when used strictly for purposes of preparing a witness for testifying at trial. In People
v. Angelini, 706 P.2d 2 (Colo. App. 1985), a co-defendant was allowed to plead guilty to sexual
assault and conspiracy to commit kidnapping in exchange for testifying against the defendant
at trial. Id. at 3. This co-defendant was hypnotized on two occasions by the district attorney,
who failed to inform the defense of the second session. Id. The court followed the rule in
People v. Quintanar, 659 P.2d 710 (Colo. App. 1982), which held that the testimony of a
previously hypnotized witness was inadmissible per se as to recollections from the time of the
hypnotic session onward, but permitted any prehypnosis statements that had been disclosed
and recorded by tape recording, video tape or written statement.
In Angelini, the co-defendant's prehypnosis statements, recorded in a police report. were
substantially corroborated, thereby satisfying Quintanar. 706 P.2d at 4. However, the motiva-
tions of the district attorney, an obviously biased party, in hypnotizing the co-defendant were
questionable. Angelini presents a particularly suspicious use of hypnosis because the co-de-
fendant had strong motivations to cooperate with the prosecution for a lesser sentence and
other evidence was available to the prosecution.
For a discussion of State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981), and the undue sugges-
tions of the hypnotist and law enforcement, see infra text accompanying notes 220-25.
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B. Confabulation 
2 1
A psychological study has shown that hypnotized subjects are able
to recall twice as many new items as those subjects not under hypnosis,
but make three times as many new errors.2" Under hypnosis, the subject
typically experiences a suspension of critical judgment which can result
in the subject's ability to "translate hunches, beliefs, and fantasies into
memories, recollections, and reported facts." 24 While in a wake state, 5
prior to hypnosis, a subject may be apt to characterize a certain reported
detail as being a guess. The previously hypnotized subject, on the other
hand, will credit the detail as accurately representing his or her memory
of the event as it occurred.
Even if people recall more information when hypnotized,
the fact that the amount of accurate information recalled in-
creases does not necessarily mean memory has been enhanced.
Instead, it may be that subjects' reduced critical judgment in
hypnosis results in their willingness to report more things about
the to-be-remembered event-including details that they would
normally reject as too uncertain to report-and that this leads
to an increase in both accurate and inaccurate information.26
"Thus, the hypnotically recalled memory is apt to be a mosaic of (1) ap-
propriate actual events, (2) entirely irrelevant actual events, (3) pure fan-
tasy, and (4) fantasized details supplied to make a logical whole.",2 7 Any
taint of confabulation may go undiscovered without affirmative evidence
to cast doubt on the witness' version, particularly because hypnotized
subjects confabulate plausible details to the event in question.2 8
22. Confabulation is defined as "a filling in of gaps in memory by free fabrication,"
WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 472 (3d ed. 1966).
23. Dywan & Bowers, The Use of Hypnosis to Enhance Recall, 222 SCIENCE 184 (1983).
24. THE FORENSIC USE OF HYPNOSIS, supra note 4, at 4. Research has shown that indi-
viduals are capable of lying under hypnosis, or may feign the entire hypnotic session, if so
motivated. Id. at 2.
25. A wake state is "[a] synonym for the normal, not-in-hypnosis, state, However, 'wake'
is used only metaphorically since hypnotized individuals are not asleep." Id. at glossary.
26. HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY, supra note 4, at 19 (emphasis in original).
"Such increases are likely to be the result of changes in what researchers call the subject's
'report criterion'-that is, the level of confidence about recollections at which individuals are
willing to report them as memory." Id. (emphasis in original).
27. Diamond, supra note 12, at 335.
28. Orne, supra note 7, at 317-18; see also State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 537-40, 432 A.2d 86,
92-93 (1981).
A hypnotized subject can confabulate details that were never capable of being perceived
by the senses. One article on the subject reports a disturbing example of a witness' ability to
confabulate. While under hypnosis, a witness was told to remove the mask of the robber. The
witness proceeded to describe the robber's face. THE FORENSIC USE OF HYPNOSIS, supra note
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The theory behind the forensic use of hypnosis is that the hypnotic
sessions will enhance the memory of the witness, thereby permitting
clearer recall of the details of the crime in question. When a witness is
hypnotized at the investigative stage, the authorities are seeking as much
information as possible.29 The witness often feels substantial pressure to
provide details and is able to do so while under hypnosis, irrespective of
the objective accuracy of the "facts." If the witness is willing to cooper-
ate or has an unconscious wish to please the interviewer, the witness may
give answers that he or she thinks the hypnotist or authorities want to
hear, even if nothing exists in the witness' prehypnotic memory to recall.
To fill the gaps where memory, or actual perception, is lacking, the sub-
ject will often confabulate details from prior memories of unrelated
events, or even fantasies. The confabulated details become part of the
subject's permanent memory of the event in question.30 No amount of
questioning on the witness stand is likely to reveal any confabulated
facts, since the witness is convinced of the "facts" as he or she "remem-
bers" them. When the previously hypnotized witness testifies in a crimi-
nal proceeding, a substantial danger exists that the testimony is tainted
by confabulation.
C. Overconfidence
Hypnosis permits a subject to recall posthypnotically that which
was "remembered" during the hypnotic session. Those facts relayed by
the subject while under hypnosis become grafted upon the subject's mem-
ory and are accepted by the subject as true, whether they were actual
facts known by the subject prior to hypnosis, confabulated facts or the
fruits of hypnotic suggestion.3 ' This phenomenon is created by the sub-
ject's suspension of critical judgment while under the power of hypnosis.
"[H]ypnosis can reduce the confidence levels required before uncertain
recollections are asserted as memories; details about which a person is
uncertain before hypnosis may, after hypnosis, be asserted as memories
confidently held."32 Thus, the subject's confidence in details as actual
4, at 4. With such an extreme degree of confabulation possible, doubt is cast on the reliability
of a hypnotized witness who reports, for example, the details of a criminal act he or she ob-
served from a distance or under poor circumstances such as on a dimly lit street late at night.
29. See supra note 7.
30. Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 4, at 1922.
31. Diamond, supra note 12, at 314; see also E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 19
(3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter MCCORMICK] (" 'Imagination and suggestion are twin artists ever
ready to retouch the fading daguerrotype of memory.' ") (quoting Gardner, The Percepetion
and Memory of Witnesses, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 390, 401 (1933)).
32. HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY, supra note 4, at 2.
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memories of the event may be a product of the hypnotic session itself.
The subject might not have been so sure had the information been re-
layed without the use of hypnosis.
Overconfidence in the accuracy of one's hypnotically enhanced
memory may pose serious problems when hypnosis is used on witnesses
or victims in preparation for testifying at a criminal trial. If the witness
had taken the stand prior to hypnosis, the manner in which the story is
relayed to the trier of fact might have revealed some uncertainty or tenta-
tiveness. After hypnosis, however, a witness' memory has been fortified.
The witness is now able to testify in detail and with complete confidence,
often crediting the knowledge to prehypnotic memory rather than recog-
nizing the possiblity that it is only a pseudomemory 33 concocted during
the hypnotic session. "Such misplaced confidence means that the hypno-
tized individual becomes a more credible witness by virtue of having been
interviewed in hypnosis."34 Unfortunately, once the subject has under-
gone hypnosis, any changes in his or her demeanor cannot be undone.
Thus, a witness' confidence attributable solely to the hypnotic session can
potentially mislead the trier of fact.35
Even with the assistance of expert testimony regarding the possible
dangers of hypnosis, a jury may be unable to properly determine the wit-
ness' credibility when he or she testifies with complete confidence. 6 The
unshakable demeanor of the witness may nullify any reservations a jury
might have about a witness' credibility. Therefore, a witness' testimony
might be given more weight than is deserved. Allowing the admission of
this overconfident, hypnotically enhanced testimony "would have the de-
fendant's innocence or guilt depend on the jury's speculating, on the ba-
33. Pseudomemory is defined as "[a] false recollection that may be brought about by con-
fabulation, suggestion, and organic factors. Though factually inaccurate, they are accepted by
the subject as actual recollections." HYPNOTICALLY REFRF.SHED TESTIMONY, supra note 4, at
glossary.
34.-Id. at 25. "The widespread belief that hypnosis will enhance memory, and tile in-
creased detail, emotion, and confidence that typically characterize recall after hypnosis, serve
to make the person's testimony more certain, regardless of its accuracy . . . ." Id. at 26-27.
35. But see 3 WIGMORE. EVIDENCE 72 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970) ("It is a commonplace
of judicial experience that testimony most glibly delivered and most positively affirmed is not
always the most trustworthy.").
36. Two commentators noted:
What the mai on the street is not usually prepared to accept is the empirical fact that
much of what is later recalled with vividness and detail, and with complete convic-
tion as to its authenticity, has in fact undergone a degree of distortion between tile
perception of the event and its recall, in some cases to such all extent that tile testi-
mony is completely false. The sense of conviction proves to be entirely unrelated to
the validity of the recall.
Haward & Ashworth, Some Problems of Evidence Obtained by Hypnosis, 1980 CRIN5. L. RI:V.
469, 474.
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sis of conflicting scientific-medical testimony, whether the [witness'
testimony] was true recollection or implanted by the hypnosis."37 Leav-
ing to the trier of fact the determination of guilt based upon such poten-
tially misleading testimony, particularly when there may be no way to
objectively evaluate its truthfulness, has dangerous implications when the
liberty of a criminal defendant is at stake.
III. A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE USE OF HYPNOSIS IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS
Due to these potential dangers and the seriousness of the conse-
quences when hypnosis affects the testimony of a previously hypnotized
witness, the reliability of hypnosis as a means of refreshing recollection
has been questioned. The distrust of hypnosis in the legal realm began
with the 1897 case of People v. Ebanks.38 In Ebanks, the defendant
sought to introduce the testimony of an expert hypnotist who was pre-
pared to testify to the defendant's innocence based upon statements made
by the defendant while under hypnosis. The trial court flatly rejected the
defendant's offer of proof, stating that "'[tlhe law of the United States
does not recognize hypnotism.' "9 The California Supreme Court
affirmed."
As hypnosis came to be recognized as a valuable tool in criminal
investigations, the phenomenon found its way into courtrooms. An in-
creasing number of cases ruled on the admissibility of hypnotically en-
hanced testimony when it formed the basis of the case against a criminal
defendant. These theories of admissibility and inadmissibility will be ex-
amined, exploring the rationale behind each theory and critically analyz-
ing their validity. In order to aid the justice system in resolving this
question, this Comment proposes objections that may be raised in re-
37. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 549, 432 A.2d 86, 98 (1981) (Sullivan, J., concurring). This
view assumes, perhaps improperly, that a trier of fact is unable to evaluate the credibility of an
overconfident witness or credit expert testimony on the dangers of hypnosis. But see People v.
Williams, 132 Cal. App. 3d 920, 928, 183 Cal. Rptr. 498, 502 (1982) (Gardner, J., concurring)
("I am firmly of the belief that jurors are quite capable of seeing through flaky testimony and
pseudoscientific claptrap."). While hypnosis may have the potential to manufacture overconfi-
dence in a subject, the same may be true for the witness who has been coached, bribed or
intimidated, or who lies on the stand. See infra text accompanying notes 52-58 for a discussion
of the credibility of previously hypnotized witnesses.
38. 117 Cal. 652, 49 P. 1049 (1897).
39. Id. at 665, 49 P. at 1053 (quoting lower court).
40. Id. Note that it is generally accepted that witnesses may not testify while under a
hypnotic trance. Diamond, supra note 12, at 321-22. For cases upholding trial courts' refusal
to permit a defendant to testify while under hypnosis, see Annotation, Admissibility of Hyp-
notic Evidence at Criminal Trial, 92 A.L.R.3d 452 (1979).
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sponse to potentially unreliable evidence which more effectively guard
against the contaminating effects of hypnosis.
A. Theories of Admissibility
Courts have generally decided hypnosis cases in four ways:
4'
(1) hypnosis testimony is per se admissible;4 2 (2) hypnosis testimony is
admissible only when certain procedural safeguards are followed;
41
41. "The approach adopted by a particular court generally reflects its perception of the
degree to which the above-mentioned problems affect a person's memory of an event." Little
v. Armontrout, 819 F.2d 1425, 1431 (8th Cir. 1987).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S,
885, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 969 (1979) (hypnosis affects credibility but not admissibility);
United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978) (hyp-
nosis affects credibility, not admissibilty); United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 281-82
(E.D. Mich. 1977) (although court recognized possibility of misidentification by previously
hypnotized witness, final determination of credibility left to jury); Pearson v. State, 441 N.E.2d
468, 473 (Ind. 1982) (previously hypnotized witness permitted to testify, leaving to trier of fact
question of weight); State v. Wren, 425 So. 2d 756, 759 (La. 1983) (issue of hypnosis is one of
credibility rather than admissibility; court did not directly consider admissibility of hypnoti-
cally induced testimony in criminal trials); State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138, 151 (N.D. 1983)
(hypnosis affects credibility rather than admissibility); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 9, 492
P.2d 312, 315 (1971) (hypnosis is issue of credibility rather than admissibility); State v.
Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897, 905 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) (testimony of previously hypnotized
witness was admissible because witness was able to provide sufficiently detailed description of
assailant prior to hypnosis; witness' posthypnotic memory did not affect judgment or prejudice
judicial process); State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 570-71, 329 N.W.2d 386, 394, cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 946 (1983) (posthypnotic testimony is admissible upon pretrial hearing dem-
onstrating that no impermissible suggestiveness was involved); Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d
1280, 1284 (Wyo. 1982) ("[a]n attack on credibility is the proper method to determine the
value of the testimony of a previously hypnotized witness"); see also Kline v. Ford Motor Co.,
523 F.2d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1975) ("[tjhat [the witness'] present memory depends upon
refreshment claimed to have been induced under hypnosis goes to the credibility of her testi-
mony not to her competence as a witness"); Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506,
509 (9th Cir. 1974) (credibility of witness whose recollection was refreshed by hypnosis treat-
ments is jury question).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Harrington, 18 M.J. 797, 802-03 (A.C.M.R. 1984) (adopted
Hurd safeguards, holding that "hypnotically-refreshed testimony ... is admissible in a crimi-
nal trial if the use of hypnosis in that case was reasonably likely to result in recall comparable
in accuracy to normal human memory"); People v. Smrekar, 68 Il. App. 3d 379, 388, 385
N.E.2d 848, 855 (1979) (testimony of previously hypnotized witness not rendered inadmissible,
even though witness was hypnotized prior to making identification, so long as proponent com-
plies with certain safeguards); Pearson v. State, 441 N.E.2d 468, 473 (Ind. 1982) (court cau-
tioned that safeguards, such as those enumerated in Hurd, must be followed to preserve
credibility of witnesses since dangers inherent in use of hypnosis are "well documented");
House v. State, 445 So. 2d 815, 826-27 (Miss. 1984) (before testimony of previously hypnotized
witness is admitted in criminal prosecution, trial judge must be satisfied that proponent has
complied with certain safeguards and that probative value of witness' posthypnotic memory is
not outweighed by prejudicial impact on accused); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 545-46, 432
A.2d 86, 96-97 (1981) (trial court to determine reliability and admissibility of hypnotically
refreshed testimony when proponent shows compliance with six safeguards); State v.
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(3) hypnosis testimony is inadmissible, calling for either the exclusion of
any such evidence obtained thereby in criminal trials," or by restricting
the testimony of a previously hypnotized witness to prehypnosis mem-
ory, barring testimony as to any memory resulting from the hypnotic
session;45 and (4) hypnosis testimony is admissible on an ad hoc basis.46
Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 689-90, 643 P.2d 246, 253-54 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (requires compli-
ance with six Hurd safeguards); State v. Weston, 16 Ohio App. 3d 279, 287-89, 475 N.E.2d
805, 813-15 (1984) (based on Hurd safeguards, testimony of two previously hypnotized prose-
cution witnesses was admissible; court further noted that testimony of these witnesses was
supported by circumstantial evidence, and thus did not prejudice defendant).
44. See, e.g., Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 138 (Alaska 1986) (prejudice/probity bal-
ance weighs per se in favor of exclusion of testimony of previously hypnotized witness); State
v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 231, 624 P.2d 1274, 1279 (1981) (testimony of previously hypnotized
witness excluded in criminal cases); State v. Atwood, 39 Conn. Supp. 273, 283-84, 479 A.2d
258, 264 (1984) (neither hypnosis nor narcoanalysis has reached general acceptance in scien-
tific community to permit admissibility of testimony of witness previously subjected to these
procedures); State v. Davis, 490 A.2d 601, 605 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985) (hypnotic recall is not
sufficiently reliable to permit its admission in criminal trials); People v. Gonzales, 415 Mich.
615, 626-27, 329 N.W.2d 743, 748 (1982) (until hypnosis is accepted as method to accurately
improve memory and barriers to cross-examination are overcome, testimony of previously
hypnotized witnesses must be excluded in criminal cases); Alsbach v. Bader, 700 S.W.2d 823,
830 (Mo. 1985) (posthypnotic testimony lacks scientific support for its reliability and should
therefore be inadmissible); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 218, 313 N.W.2d 648, 655 (1981)
(until hypnosis is accepted as accurate method of improving memory, witness may not testify
in criminal proceeding regarding subject matter of hypnotic session); State v. Peoples, 311
N.C. 515, 531-32, 319 S.E.2d 177, 187 (1984) (hypnotically refreshed testimony too unreliable
to be admitted in judicial proceeding); Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316, 1327 (Okla. Crim. App.
1975) (statements made under hypnosis are inadmissible when offered for truth of those state-
ments); Commonwealth v. Smoyer, 505 Pa. 83, 85, 476 A.2d 1304, 1306 (1984) (testimony of
previously hypnotized witness is inadmissible as evidence); see also State v. Ture, 353 N.W.2d
502, 513-14 (Minn. 1984) (although Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged that it has "con-
sistently adhered to the rule of general inadmissibility of hypnotically-induced testimony in
criminal cases," court found this to be "rare case" in which conviction may nonetheless be
sustained since little difference existed between witness' prehypnotic testimony and post-
hypnotic testimony, she never positively identified defendant and five other witnesses also pro-
vided descriptions); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 111,436 A.2d 170, 178 (1981)
("While we do not want to establish a per se rule of inadmissibility at this time, we will not
permit the introduction of hypnotically-refreshed testimony until we are presented with more
conclusive proof than has been offered to date of the reliability of hypnotically-retrieved
memory.").
45. See, e.g., State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 209-10, 644 P.2d 1266,
1295 (1982) (supplemental opinion) (witness permitted to testify to that which was
remembered and related prior to hypnosis); People v. Guerra, 37 Cal. 3d 385, 427, 690 P.2d
635, 664-65, 208 Cal. Rptr. 162, 190 (1984) (testimony of previously hypnotized witness inad-
missible as to all matters relating to event at issue from time of hypnosis forward); People v.
Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 66-67, 723 P.2d 1354, 1383, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 272, cert. deuied, 458
U.S. 1125, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982) (testimony of previously hypnotized witness inad-
missible as to all matters relating to event at issue from time of hypnosis forward) (Shirley was
originally reported at 641 P.2d 775; this Comment will cite to the opinion as modified on
denial of rehearing at 723 P.2d 1354); People v. Quintanar, 659 P.2d 710, 711 (Colo. App.
1982) (testimony of previously hypnotized witness is per se inadmissible as to that witness'
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The effectiveness of these theories in curbing the potential dangers of
memory from time of hypnotic session, although witness is permitted to testify to prehypnosis
recollections that have been adequately disclosed and recorded); Elliotte v. State, 515 A.2d
677, 681-82 (Del. 1986) (witness is not necessarily rendered incompetent due to pretrial use of
hypnosis; "[i]f the scope of the witness's prehypnotic recollection can be reliably determined,
and if the party proffering the evidence meets its burden of proving no substantial impairment
of the right to cross-examination, the witness may testify within the scope of his prehypnotic
recollection"); Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9, 18-19 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 295
(1986) (since previously hypnotized witness is not incompetent in strict sense, witness may
testify to all matters other than those remembered only after hypnosis; court approved of use
of hypnosis as investigative tool but held inadmissible any posthypnotic testimony when hyp-
notic session takes place after case is final); Walraven v. State, 255 Ga. 276, 282, 336 S.E.2d
798, 803 (1985) (previously hypnotized witness may testify to recorded statements made prior
to hypnosis or to events occurring after hypnotic session); State v. Moreno, 709 P.2d 103, 105
(Hawaii 1985) (witness is permitted to testify to prehypnosis memory but all hypnotically
induced recollections are per se inadmissible); State v. Haislip, 237 Kan. 461, 482, 701 P,2d
909, 926, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1022 (1985) (testimony regarding events recalled subsequent to
hypnosis not admissible); State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 702, 464 A.2d 1028, 1044 (1983)
(witness permitted to testify to statements which proponent can clearly demonstrate were
made prior to hypnosis); Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 529, 447 N.E.2d 1190, 1197
(1983) (testimony regarding matters not remembered prior to hypnosis inadmissible); People v.
Nixon, 421 Mich. 79, 90, 364 N.W.2d 593, 599 (1984) (witness permitted to testify only to
those facts recalled and related prior to hypnosis; burden on proponent to establish reliability
by clear and convincing evidence); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 771 (Minn. 1980) (witness
who has undergone hypnosis may not testify in criminal trial regarding post-hyponsis recollec-
tion); State v. Patterson, 213 Neb. 686, 692, 331 N.W.2d 500, 504 (1983) (witness not rendered
incompetent due to hypnosis; witness is permitted to testify to those matters recalled and re-
lated prior to hypnotic session on sufficient showing that evidence was in fact known and
related prior to hypnosis); People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 545, 453 N.E.2d 484, 495, 466
N.Y.S.2d 255, 266 (1983) (pretrial use of hypnosis does not render witness incompetent to
testify to matters recalled prior to hypnotic session); State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 533, 319
S.E.2d 177, 188 (1984) (hypnotically refreshed testimony is inadmissible except for facts re-
lated prior to hypnosis); Robison v. State, 677 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. de-
nied, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984) (witness may not be permitted to make in-court identification
following hypnosis when identification has not previously been made; however, in this case
evidence of guilt was overwhelming even without identification testimony); State v. Martin,
101 Wash. 2d 713, 722, 684 P.2d 651, 657 (1984) (witness may not testify in criminal trial to
facts not remembered prior to hypnosis but will be permitted to testify to prehypnotic memory,
with burden of proof on proponent to prove that facts were recalled prior to hypnosis).
46. See, e.g., Little v. Armontrout, 819 F.2d 1425, 1433 (8th Cir. 1987) (suggestive identifi-
cation procedure rendered victim's identification of defendant as her assailant constitutionally
unreliable); McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F.2d 951, 960-61 (4th Cir. 1987) (court weighed all
factors involved in eyewitness' posthypnosis account of crimes involved, concluding that she
testified independent of dangers associated with use of hypnosis); United States v. Kimberlin,
805 F.2d 210, 219 (7th Cir. 1986) (court permitted testimony of six previously hypnotized
witness; unlikely that dangers of hypnosis affected jury's verdict); Beck v. Norris, 801 F.2d
242, 244 (6th Cir. 1986) (court considered circumstances surrounding identification testimony
of previously hypnotized witness in denying defendant's due process challenge); United States
v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1203 (5th Cir. 1984) (court excluded uncorroborated personal iden-
tification made only after hypnosis; defendant was known suspect at time witness was hypno-
tized); United States v. Charles, 561 F. Supp. 633, 697 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (court weighed all
factors, concluding that probative value of hypnotically refreshed testimony was substantially
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hypnosis will be critically examined, recognizing the possible damage
caused both by overly liberal and overly restrictive theories of
admissibility.
1. Per se admissibility
Courts that consider hypnotically induced testimony to be per se
admissible47 adopt the position that "[tihe hypnotic session is just one of
many factors which can affect a witness." 4 Through cross-examination
and the introduction of expert testimony regarding the reliability of hyp-
nosis as a means of refreshing recollection, the trier of fact is given the
information from which to weigh the possible effects of hypnosis on a
witness' testimony presented at trial.4 9 The fact finder is then free to
decide whether the evidence is credible and should be considered in its
decision.
This position is in accord with the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
provide for the admissibility of all relevant evidence, absent evidentiary
constraints calling for its exclusion.5° The proponent of hypnotically re-
freshed testimony should be permitted to submit such evidence to the
outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice); United States v. Waksal, 539 F. Supp. 834, 838
(S.D. Fla. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 709 F.2d 653 (1 lth Cir. 1983) (court found testimony
of previously hypnotized police officers to be product of witness' own recollection, untainted
by hypnosis, and therefore admissible); State v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 618, 625, 682 P.2d 571, 578
(1984) (adopted totality of circumstances approach to determining reliability of hypnotically
induced or enhanced testimony); Vester v. State, 684 S.W.2d 715, 722 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983),
aff'd en banc, 713 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (totality of circumstances approach to
determining reliability of posthypnotic identification testimony); see also Spryncznatyk v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112, 1122-23 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1263 (1986)
(adopted case by case approach to admissibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony; district
court is to conduct pretrial hearing to determine reliability of testimony, placing burden of
proof on proponent, taking into account degree to which safeguards were followed, appropri-
ateness of hypnosis in light of facts of case and corroborating evidence and weigh effect against
probative value of testimony).
47. See supra note 42.
48. Pearson v. State, 441 N.E.2d 468, 473 (Ind. 1982).
49. The United States Supreme Court in Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987), ruled
on the admissibility of testimony from a previously hypnotized defendant accused of man-
slaughter. Although the Court recognized the dangers inherent in the use of hypnosis, the
majority opinion noted that its use did not necessarily contaminate the evidence:
The more traditional means of assessing accuracy of testimony also remain ap-
plicable in the case of a previously hypnotized defendant. Certain information re-
called as a result of hypnosis may be verified as highly accurate by corroborating
evidence. Cross-examination, even in the face of a confident defendant, is an effective
tool for revealing inconsistencies. Moreover, a jury can be educated to the risks of
hypnosis through expert testimony and cautionary instructions.
Id. at 2714. For a discussion of the Rock decision, see infra text accompanying notes 243-87 &
288-96.
50. FED. R. EvID. 402. A number of evidentiary provisions exclude evidence which may
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jury for resolution of the question of credibility so long as the evidence is
not unduly prejudicial." Restricting the admissibility of evidence in any
way is to risk the loss of relevant evidence.
The use of hypnosis, however, may affect the ability of the trier of
fact to draw the proper inferences from testimony submitted by a previ-
ously hypnotized witness. Traditional methods of testing the credibility
of a witness may be ineffective in revealing the truthfulness of hypnoti-
cally enhanced testimony.5 2 One commentator noted:
When dealing with an unhypnotized witness, inconsistent de-
tails and differing versions of an event will often provide the
strongest ammunition for impeachment. Such inconsistencies
are generally unavailable for use against the hypnotized wit-
ness .... [A] fantasizing hypnotic subject tends to confabulate
in a way that will fill in the gaps in his fantasy so as to create a
logical, consistent story. He will also develop rationalizations
to explain potential inconsistencies. Coupled with the witness's
belief in the truth of his story, these tendencies render cross-
examination worthless as a tool to expose the possibility that a
hypnotically-aided memory might be the inaccurate product of
suggestion. 3
Thus, impeachment of a witness through cross-examination may prove
futile when attacking the credibility of a witness who has been hypno-
tized for purposes of enhancing his or her memory.-
4
be relevant, such as unduly prejudicial evidence (Id. 403), extrinsic policies (Id. 404-12) and
hearsay (Id. 801).
This theory of per se admissibility also involves the issue of the competency of previously
hypnotized witnesses. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that all persons are competent
to be witnesses, absent other evidentiary constraints. Id. 601. Courts admitting the testimony
of a previously hypnotized witness conclude that hypnosis does not render the witness incom-
petent to testify. See infra note 79. For a discussion of the competency of previously hypno-
tized witnesses, see infra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
51. FED. R. EvID. 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." For a discussion of Rule 403 and the hypnotized wit-
ness, see infra text accompanying notes 143-52.
52. But see Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2714; see supra note 49.
53. Mickenberg, Mesmerizing Justice: The Use of Hypnotically-Induced Testimony in
Criminal Trials, 34 SYRACUSE L. REv. 927, 957 (1983); see also supra notes 22-30 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of confabulation.
54. One of the five principle methods used to attack a witness' credibility involves the
showing of a defect in the capacity of the witness to observe, remember or recount the events
to which he or she testifies. MCCORMICK, supra note 31, at 72-73. After hypnosis, these
capacities of the witness may be drastically altered. Although a witness may testify to matters
that are believed to be within his or her true perceptions of the event, the testimony may be
January 1988] HYPNOSIS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
This issue of credibility necessarily involves consideration of the
jury's ability to evaluate scientific or experimental procedures that result
in the reconstruction of memory, as presented through expert testimony.
"[T]he jury may be so influenced by its suppositions concerning the pro-
cess of hypnosis that revelation of the fact that a witness's testimony was
influenced by hypnosis may give it even greater credence in the jury's
eyes.""5 The nature of hypnosis is such that jurors may be unable to "see
through" the witness' memory to any possible contamination caused by
the hypnosis.
Yet, as those courts favoring admissibility note, hypnosis may not
always affect the witness' memory. Hypnosis may cause no ill effects at
all, in which case the system of justice would be greatly disadvantaged by
excluding testimony on the chance that the witness is not telling the
truth. Both the proponent and opponent of the testimony may aid the
trier of fact by presenting expert testimony regarding the potential dan-
gers of hypnosis. 6 The fact finder is then left to determine the influence
without objective support. When this witness takes the stand, he or she may not be able to
recognize any possible defect in his or her perception of the event, since hypnosis renders
subjects certain of their beliefs. Thus, counsel's attempts to discredit the witness by question-
ing regarding the hypnotic session will not effectively bring out the inaccuracies of the testi-
mony. This potential impediment to cross-examination may rise to the level of a constitutional
violation. For a discussion of the confrontation clause and the previously hypnotized witness,
see infra notes 154-202 and accompanying text.
That is not to say that the previously hypnotized witness is incapable of being impeached.
See Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2714; see also supra note 49. The cross-examiner may impeach the
witness by presenting evidence demonstrating that the witness' version of the events differed
prior to hypnosis. This brings to light the importance of carefully memorializing the witness'
story prior to the hypnotic session. Confronting the witness with his or her inconsistent ac-
counts may not cause the witness to change the testimony. However, this method of impeach-
ment may raise a suspicion in the trier of fact, causing the testimony to be questioned rather
than accepted for its truth.
55. United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1202 (5th Cir. 1984). "The jury's assumptions
concerning the nature of memory and the accuracy of hypnosis may make the testimony so
prejudicial that its weight is impossible to overcome." 1d; see also Giannelli, The Admissibility
of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
1197, 1240 (1980) ("the assumption of jury capability provides a shaky foundation upon which
to construct an approach to admissibility of novel scientific techniques"). But see People v.
Williams, 132 Cal. App. 3d 920, 928, 183 Cal. Rptr. 498, 502 (1982) (Gardner, J., concurring)
("jurors are quite capable of seeing through flaky testimony and pseudoscientific claptrap").
56. Dr. Bernard L. Diamond and Dr. Martin T. Orne are two of the most prominent
experts in the field of hypnosis, specializing in the effect of hypnosis on a witness' testimony
presented in a criminal trial. Dr. Diamond is well-known for his rather extreme view that
hypnosis renders the previously hypnotized subject incompetent to be a witness and has served
as a defense expert witness numerous times. See United States v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678, 703
(7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2919 (1986); United States v. Waksal, 539 F. Supp. 834,
838 (S.D. Fla. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 709 F.2d 653 (1 1th Cir. 1983); State v. Wren, 425
So. 2d 756, 758 (La. 1983); People v. Sorscher, 151 Mich. App. 122, 127, 391 N.W.2d 365, 367
(1986); State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 684, 643 P.2d 246, 248 (1981); State v. Brown, 337
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of any dangers in each particular case.
Still, the danger remains that the trier of fact may not be able to
determine whether any hypnotically induced change has occurred, par-
ticularly when the witness appears to be truthful. While the potential
dangers of suggestibility, confabulation and overconfidence inherent in
hypnotically induced recall may be understood, the fact finder may not
be able to recognize whether these dangers affected the testimony of this
witness. 7 Introduction of expert witness testimony does not guarantee
N.W.2d 138, 143 (N.D. 1983). See generally Diamond, supra note 12. Dr. Orne also disputes
the reliability of hypnosis as a means of refreshing recollection and has similarly served as an
expert witness in many criminal cases. See United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 281-82
(E.D. Mich. 1977); Peterson v. State, 448 N.E.2d 673, 677-78 (Ind. 1983); State v. Mack, 292
N.W.2d 764, 766 (Minn. 1980); State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 566, 329 N.W.2d 386,
392, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 946 (1983); see also HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY,
supra note 4, foreword (credits Dr. Orne with having served as an expert witness in over thirty
cases, including Patty Hearst's trial and the Hillside Strangler case). Dr. Orne developed the
procedureal safeguards adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Hurd, 86 N.J.
525, 545-46, 432 A.2d 86, 96-97 (1981). See THE FORENSIC USE OF HYPNOSIS, supra note 4,
at 5; HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY, supra note 4, at 41-49.
However, reliance on the opinions of experts in determining guilt or innocence in a crimi-
nal trial is suspect, particularly when the experts make their livelihood out of espousing their
particular view rather than serving as a neutral commentator on a disputed topic. See Mor-
gan, Practical Difficulties Impeding Reform in the Law of Evidence, 14 VAND. L. REv. 725,
733 (1961) ("[t]he abuse of expert opinion evidence in modern litigation ... has become in
many states a scandal, for the expert witness has become in truth an adovocate for the party
who presents him rather than a witness"). While the use of expert testimony is invaluable in
educating the trier of fact, expert testimony should be carefully scrutinized, since the neutrality
of the expert is often questionable.
57. The California Evidence Code includes a general provision listing possible factors that
may affect the credibility of a witness. CAL. EViD. CODE § 780 (West 1966). The Federal
Rules of Evidence do not have a similar provision on this point. The California provision,
while not all inclusive, provides the trier of fact with a number of common factors that may be
useful in evaluating the truthfulness of a witness' testimony. Included among the relevant
factors are the witness' "demeanor while testifying and the manner in which he testifies,"
"[the extent of his capacity to perceive, to recollect, or to communicate any matter about
which he testifies," and "[t]he extent of his opportunity to percieve any matter about which he
testifies." Id. § 780 (a), (c), (d).
When considering the testimony of a previously hypnotized witness, evaluation of the
witness' credibility based on these factors may be misleading. As seen above, one of the dan-
gers of hypnosis is that it creates overconfidence in the accuracy of the witness' recollection.
See supra text accompanying notes 31-37 for a discussion of overconfidence. At trial, this
translates into effectively altering the witness' demeanor. Thus, while the witness' demeanor
seems unshakable, in reality, the witness may be mistaken in the belief that his or her post-
hypnotic memory is accurate. Further, the witness' capacity to perceive, recollect or commu-
nicate is necessarily questionable, since the witness was hypnotized because of an inability to
recall the events that took place or to relay that information to the authorities. The witness'
opportunity to perceive the event about which he or she testifies may also have been altered by
hypnosis. Under hypnosis, the subject may incorporate suggestions of the hypnotist or confab-
ulate details, resulting in an enhanced memory which may consist of inaccuracies, See supra
text accompanying notes 13-30 for a discussion of suggestibility and confabulation. Thus, even
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that the trier of fact will be able to determine whether hypnosis affected
the witness' testimony. The serious consequences which may result from
the alteration of a witness' demeanor suggests that the credibility of a
previously hypnotized witness may not be a proper issue for the trier of
fact.58 Thus, per se admissibility of hypnosis testimony may invite the
introduction of unreliable evidence.
2. Admissible with the use of safeguards
Another theory of admissibility permits the introduction of hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony only if certain procedural safeguards are fol-
lowed.59 This theory also recognizes the potential dangers of hypnosis
but maintains that a hypnotic session can be conducted in such a manner
as to guard against contaminating the witness' memory. In State v.
Hurd,6" the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted a number of safeguards
to be followed in hypnosis cases to ensure a minimum level of reliability
and to establish a record for evaluating the reliability of the procedure
used.6" The Hurd safeguards allow the introduction of hypnotically re-
freshed testimony if the following requirements are met: (1) the session
must be conducted by a psychiatrist or psychologist experienced in the
use of hypnosis who should also be able to qualify as an expert witness at
though the jury may hear testimony from a witness describing his or her perception of the
event, if that witness was hypnotized prior to trial, the testimony alone may not provide an
adequate basis for determining the witness' credibility.
58. But see State v. Contreras, 674 P.2d 792, 799-802 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 718
P.2d 129 (Alaska 1986). Contreras suggested that the potential problems in evaluating the
credibility of a previously hypnotized witness are not unique to the use of hypnosis to refresh
recollection. The dangers inherent in the refreshed memory of a hypnotized subject are simi-
larly present in any eyewitness. Id. at 799-802.
The argument that previously hypnotized witnesses should be disqualified from testi-
fying gains force only if hypnotism creates a risk of distorting memory that is sub-
stantially greater than, or qualitatively distinct from, the risk ordinarily posed by
interrogating a victim who has rapport with her questioner and who has a vital inter-
est in the identification and conviction of her assailant. In contrast, if improper inter-
rogative techniques and the normal experiences encountered by eyewitnesses account
for virtually all instances of memory distortion, then no special rule for hypnotism
would appear to be-warranted.
Id. at 802
59. See supra note 43.
60. 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
61. Id. at 545-46. 432 A.2d at 96-97. The Hurd safeguards are based on the procedural
requirements suggested by Dr. Martin T. Orne. See THE FORENSIC USE OF HYPNOSIS, supra
note 4, at 5; HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHEt) TESTIMONY, supra note 4, at 41-49; see also C.I..
Evi). CODE § 795 (West Supp. 1987). The California Evidence Code adopted a provision
which governs the admissibility of testimony of a hypnosis subject. This code section provides
as follows:
(a) The testimony of a witness is not inadmissible in a criminal proceeding by
reason of the fact that the witness has previously undergone hypnosis for the purpose
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trial if needed; (2) the professional should be independent of the prosecu-
of recalling events which are the subject of the witness' testimony, if all of the follow-
ing conditions are met:
(I) The testimony is limited to those matters which the witness recalled and
related prior to the hypnosis.
(2) The substance of the prehypnotic memory was preserved in written, audi-
otape, or videotape form prior to the hypnosis.
(3) The hypnosis was conducted in accordance with all of the following proce-
dures:
(A) A written record was made prior to hypnosis documenting the subject's
description of the event, and information which was provided to the hypnotist con-
cerning the subject matter of the hypnosis.
(B) The subject gave informed consent to the hypnosis.
(C) The hypnosis session, including the pre- and post-hypnosis interviews, was
videotape recorded for subsequent review.
(D) The hypnosis was performed by a licensed medical doctor or psychologist
experienced in the use of hypnosis and independent of and not in the presence of law
enforcement, the prosecution, or the defense.
(4) Prior to admission of the testimony, the court holds a hearing pursuant to
Section 402 of the Evidence Code[, the procedure for determining foundational or
preliminary facts,] at which the proponent of the evidence proves by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the hypnosis did not so affect the witness as to render the wit-
ness' prehypnosis recollection unreliable or to substantially impair the ability to
cross-examine the witness concerning the witness' prehypnosis recollection. At the
hearing, each side shall have the right to present expert testimony and to cross-ex-
amine witnesses.
(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the ability of a party to
attack the credibility of a witness who has undergone hypnosis, or to limit other legal
grounds to admit or exclude the testimony of that witness.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 795 (West Supp. 1987). People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 723 P.2d 1354,
181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1125, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982), was control-
ling in California prior to the enactment of this specific provision in the California Evidence
Code. Shirley held inadmissible the testimony of a previously hypnotized witness as to the
events that were the subject of the hypnotic session. Id. at 71-72, 641 P.2d at 1387, 181 Cal.
Rptr. at 275-76. Now, California Evidence Code § 795 governs the admissibility of hypnosis
in a criminal trial, thereby leading the way to a more consistent application of evidentiary
rulings on the issue of hypnosis.
Oregon has also adopted statutes governing the admissibility of testimony of a previously
hypnotized witness. Like its California counterpart, Oregon has established prerequisites to
the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony and adopted an expansive definition of an
hypnotic state. One section provides:
If either prosecution or defense in any criminal proceeding in the State of Oregon
intends to offer the testimony of any person, including the defendant, who has been
subjected to hypnosis, mesmerism or any other form of the exertion of will power or
the power of suggestion which is intended to or results in a state of trance, sleep or
entire or partial unconsciousness relating to the subject matter of the proposed testi-
mony, performed by any person, it shall be a condition of the use of such testimony
that the entire procedure be recorded either on videotape or any mechanical record-
ing device. The unabridged videotape or mechanical recording shall be made avail-
able to the other party or parties in accordance with ORS 135.805 to 135.873.
OR. REV. STAT. § 136.675 (1985). Additional sections provide for the informed consent of the
subject to be hypnotized (Id. § 136.685 (1985)) and the inadmissibility of testimony obtained in
violation of the conditions and consent requirements of §§ 136.675 and 136.685 (Id. § 136.695
(1985)).
In the aftermath of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Rock v. Arkansas, 107
S. Ct. 2704 (1987), the Arkansas Attorney General is currently drafting guidelines for the
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tion, investigator or defense; (3) all information conveyed to the hypno-
tist prior to the session must be recorded; (4) the hypnotist must obtain a
detailed description of the facts from the subject prior to hypnosis, so as
to avoid undue suggestion; (5) all contacts between the hypnotist and the
subject must be recorded, preferably on videotape; and (6) only the hyp-
notist and the subject may be present through all stages of the hypnotic
session. 6' Before the trier of fact considers the admissibility of the evi-
dence, the party seeking to introduce the hypnotically enhanced testi-
mony must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the procedural
safeguards have been met.63
The Hurd safeguards have been criticized for inadequately immu-
nizing the witness from any adverse effects of hypnosis. While the six
factors adopted by the Hurd court effectively protect against intentional
suggestiveness, they are ineffective in protecting the hypnotized subject
from unintentional suggestions or problems of confabulation. 64 The use
of safeguards can avoid pitfalls at the investigative stage, but they do not
ensure that the resulting testimony is reliable.65 The Hurd safeguards do
nothing to protect the defendant who is faced with subsequent testimony
of the previously hypnotized witness.66 The traditional tools of attacking
a witness' credibility may prove ineffective in hypnosis cases, where the
witness' memory is subject to contamination, even if the Hurd safeguards
are followed. 67 Since the burden is on the accused to prove the unrelia-
admissibility of posthypnosis testimony based on the Hurd safeguards. Stewart, Hypnotized
Witnesses, Loaded Jurors, 73 A.B.A. J. 54, 57-58 (October 1, 1987). Hopefully, other states
will enact similar legislation governing the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony,
providing for more consistent resolution of hypnosis cases.
62. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 545-46, 432 A.2d at 96-97.
63. Id. at 546, 432 A.2d at 97. The court in Hurd noted:
We recognize that this standard places a heavy burden upon the use of hypnosis for
criminal trial purposes. This burden is justified by the potential for abuse of hypno-
sis, the genuine likelihood of suggestiveness and error, and the consequent risk of
injustice. Hypnotically refreshed testimony must not be used where it is not reason-
ably likely to be accurate evidence. The burden of proof we adopt here will assure
strict compliance with the procedural guidelines set forth in this opinion. It will also
limit the admissibility of this kind of evidence to those cases where a party can con-
vincingly demonstrate that hypnosis was a reasonably reliable means of reviving
memory comparable in its accuracy to normal recall.
Id. (footnote omitted).
64. Mickenberg, supra note 53, at 964; see also Little v. Armontrout, 819 F.2d 1425, 1432
n.18 (8th Cir. 1987); Beaver, Memory Restored or Confabulated by Hypnosis-Is It Conipe-
tent?, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 155, 203 (1983).
65. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 186-87, 644 P.2d 1266. 1272
(1982), overruled on other grounds by State v. Nunez, 135 Ariz. 257, 660 P.2d 858 (1983).
66. Mickenberg, supra note 53, at 964.
67. Id. at 965.
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bility of any indentification submitted against him,68 "[t]he defendant is
faced with potentially false and highly prejudicial testimony, but without
means of testing its accuracy or controlling its impact on a jury.
69
Yet, the use of safeguards is not totally invalid, since they protect
against the more apparent dangers of hypnosis. "Such guidelines do not
guarantee the accuracy of the testimony, because they cannot control the
subject's own motivations or any tendency to confabulate, but they do
provide a means of controlling overt suggestions."70 Their use may yield
more reliable "memories" reported at the investigative stage, which may
lead to corroborating evidence against an accused. This, in turn, would
make the testimony of the previously hypnotized witness less crucial to
the prosecution's case. The observance of safeguards can aid the discov-
ery process by placing checks on the use of hypnosis, thereby reducing
the negative influence of hypnosis on a witness' memory.
3. Per se inadmissibility
Courts concluding that testimony of a previously hypnotized wit-
ness should not be admitted in criminal trials have excluded the witness'
testimony either in whole or in part. Some courts conclude that a wit-
ness who has been hypnotized is prohibited from testifying at all,71 while
other courts permit the witness to testify to his or her prehypnosis mem-
ory, but not to any recollections from the time of the hypnotic session
onward. 72 These theories of inadmissibility recognize the severity of the
dangers associated with the use of hypnosis, as well as the potential con-
stitutional violations when hypnotically refreshed testimony is admitted
against a criminal defendant.73
68. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 548, 432 A.2d at 97-98. For a discussion of eyewitness identification
and the previously hypnotized witness, see infra text accompanying notes 204-26.
69. Mickenberg, supra note 53, at 965.
One court rejected the Hurd safeguards on the grounds that the determination of admissi-
bility on a case by case basis is impractical. State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 217, 313 N.W.2d
648, 654 (1981). The Palmer court noted that the Hurd view of admissibility must necessarily
rely on expert opinions-a process which is itself subject to dispute:
To base the admissibility of evidence in a given case on the testimony of competing
expert witnesses imposes unjustified burdens on the criminal justice system in the
field of hypnosis where the consensus of expert testimony indicates that no expert can
determine whether memory retrieved by hypnosis or any part of that memory is
truth, falsehood, or fantasy.
Id. at 217-18, 313 N.W.2d at 655.
70. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2714.
71. See supra note 44.
72. See supra note 45.
73. See infra notes 153-237 and accompanying text for a discussion of the constitutional
issues involved in the prosecution's use of hypnosis in criminal trials.
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The Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Mena74 noted:
The determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused
should not depend on the unknown consequences of a proce-
dure concededly used for the purpose of changing in some way
a witness' memory. Therefore, until hypnosis gains general ac-
ceptance in the fields of medicine and psychiatry as a method
by which memories are accurately improved without undue
danger of distortion, delusion or fantasy, we feel that testimony
of witnesses which has been tainted by hypnosis should be ex-
cluded in criminal cases.75
At times, these dangers have justified the exclusion of any testimony
from the previously hypnotized witness.76 Thus, all evidence regarding
the use of hypnosis is kept from the trier of fact and the case against the
criminal defendant is based on the presentation of evidence from sources
other than the previously hypnotized witness.
The other theory of per se inadmissibility permits the previously
hypnotized witness to testify, but restricts the testimony to his or her
prehypnosis memory. This approach views the total exclusion of testi-
mony as unnecessarily extreme because it excludes even that which is
relevant and untainted by the hypnotic procedure.77 While the dangers
associated with the use of hypnosis may be significant, the practical real-
ity of hypnosis as an indispensable investigative tool outweighs that
threat.7" Still, the potential relevancy of the evidence is not so compel-
ling as to warrant its unconditional admission. Thus, this position in
effect salvages that part of the witness' memory before it may have be-
come tainted by hypnosis by permitting the witness to testify to those
recollections.
Courts holding the testimony of the previously hypnotized witness
inadmissible either in whole or in part have generally done so under two
theories of exclusion: first, hypnosis renders the witness incompetent to
offer testimony at trial; and, second, hypnosis is not generally accepted as
74. 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981).
75. Id. at 231, 624 P.2d at 1279.
76. See supra note 44.
77. See State v. Seager, 341 N.W.2d 420, 431 (Iowa 1983) (exclusion of all testimony is
unnecessarily extreme because it "will often have the effect of throwing the baby out with the
bath water").
78. Collins, 132 Ariz. at 187, 210, 644 P.2d at 1273, 1296 (supplemental opinion). "As a
practical matter, if we are to maintain the rule of incompetency, the police will seldom dare to
use hypnosis as an investigatory tool because they will thereby risk making the witness incom-
petent if it is later determined that the testimony of that witness is essential." Id. at 209, 644
P.2d at 1295 (supplemental opinion).
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sufficiently reliable in the scientific community to justify admittance in a
criminal trial. These bases for exclusion must be critically examined,
questioning their viability in light of the rules of evidence.
a. competency of witnesses
Courts have held hypnosis testimony inadmissible on the grounds
that hypnosis renders the witness incompetent to testify.79 Proponents of
this view conclude that the use of hypnosis "renders the potential witness
incompetent, literally destroying the probative value of any evidence that
the witness might otherwise have been able to produce."80 The potential
dangers of hypnosis and incompetency of any previously hypnotized wit-
ness thus justifies keeping from the trier of fact all information about the
hypnotic session, regardless of the relevance of the information.
This view, however, does not correspond to the evidentiary standard
for competency of witnesses. The Federal Rules of Evidence8' signifi-
79. See, e.g., Collins, 132 Ariz. at 190, 644 P.2d at 1276 (previously hypnotized witness
incompetent to testify); Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 67, 723 P.2d at 1384, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273
(previously hypnotized witness incompetent, although not in literal sense; court further noted
that "if the prosecution should wish to question such a witness on a topic wholly unrelated to
the events that were the subject of the hypnotic session, [the witness'] testimony as to that
topic would not be rendered inadmissible by the present rule") (emphasis in original); State v.
Joblin, 107 Idaho 351, 354, 689 P.2d 767, 771 (1984) (within trial judge's discretion to declare
previously hypnotized witness incompetent); State v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 618, 625, 682 P.2d
571, 578 (1984) (if at pretrial hearing trial court finds testimony to be unreliable-using total-
ity of circumstances test-then witness may be judged incompetent; court established "a rule
of competency, not an exclusionary rule intended to punish one side or another for some per-
ceived misconduct in the manner in which the hypnosis was conducted.. ."); Diamond, supra
note 12, at 314 ("once a potential witness has been hypnotized for the purpose of enhancing
memory his recollections have been so contaminated that he is rendered effectively incompe-
tent to testify"). But see Little, 819 F.2d at 1435 (fact that hypnosis tainted victim's identifica-
tion did not make her incompetent as a witness; victim permitted to testify to prehypnotic
memory of event); Valdez, 722 F.2d at 1204 (court's decision to exclude tainted identification
made under hypnosis does not render witness incompetent); Collins, 132 Ariz. at 209, 664 P.2d
at 1295 (supplemental opinion) (restricted majority opinion on rehearing, concluding that hyp-
nosis does not render witness incompetent to testify to facts demonstrably recalled prior to
hypnosis); State v. Long, 32 Wash. App. 732, 735, 649 P.2d 845, 846 (1982) (witness deemed
competent to testify since no evidence indicated that witness' mind was unsound because of
hypnosis).
80. Diamond, supra note 12, at 332. Diamond further states:
I believe that once a potential witness has been hypnotized for the purpose of enhanc-
ing memory his recollections have been so contaminated that he is rendered effec-
tively incompetent to testify. . . . After hypnosis the subject cannot differentiate
between a true recollection and a fantasy or a suggested detail. Neither can any
expert or the trier of fact. This risk is so great, in my view, that the use of hypnosis
by police on a potential witness is tantamount to the destruction ... of evidence.
Id. at 314.
81. FED. R. EVID. 601. For state adaptation of Federal Rule of Evidence 601, see 3 J.
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cantly changed the common law on the issue of witness competency,82
eliminating judicial discretion to determine admissibility. Rule 601 ex-
plicitly provides that every person is competent to be a witness, absent
constraints imposed by the rules. 3 The enactment of this succinct rule
of evidence was a broad ground-clearing measure, abolishing previous
common law rules of incompetency, such as religious belief, conviction of
a crime, interest in the litigation or spousal relationship to an interested
party. The federal rule that all witnesses are competent is preferable be-
cause "rules which disqualify witnesses who have knowledge of relevant
facts and mental capacity to convey that knowledge are serious obstruc-
tions to the ascertainment of truth."84
Courts' exclusion of testimony of previously hypnotized witnesses
based on competency clearly cannot be reconciled with the rules of evi-
dence. With the possible exception of the witness' personal knowledge of
the events in question,85 nothing about the nature of a previously hypno-
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 601[06], at 601-39 to -50 (1985 &
Supp. 1987).
82. See also CAL. EVID. CODE § 700 (West Supp. 1987). The California Evidence Code,
which was the precursor to the Federal Rules of Evidence, enacted a broad rule with respect to
competency of witnesses. The California Evidence Code provides that "every person, irrespec-
tive of age, is qualified to be a witness and no person is disqualified to testify to any matter."
Id. Section 700 is limited by an additional section, which provides that a witness may be
disqualified only if he or she is "[i]ncapable of expressing himself or herself concerning the
matter so as to be understood" or if the witness is "[i]ncapable of understanding the duty of a
witness to tell the truth." Id. § 701 (a) (1) & (2) (West Supp. 1987). Thus, read together, these
two sections provide that every witness is competent, leaving to the determination of the court
only the issue of the witness' ability to communicate and appreciation of the duty to tell the
truth on the stand.
Other sections of the California Evidence Code also govern witness' competency. See id.
§ 701 (West Supp. 1987) (mental or physical capacity to be witness); id. § 702 (West 1966)
(requirement of personal knowledge); id. § 703 (West 1966) (judge as witness); id. § 704 (West
1966) (juror as witness); id. §§ 900-1070 (West 1966) (privileges); id. § 1150 (West 1966) (lim-
iting use of evidence concerning jury misconduct). Prior to the enactment of the Evidence
Code, the law in California provided that the competency of a witness was a question to be
determined by the court, depending upon the witness' capacity to understand the oath and to
perceive, recollect and communicate that which he or she is offered to relate. Id. § 701 Law
Revision Commission comment (West 1966). Under § 701, the question of competency re-
mains to be determined by the court. See also id. § 405 (West 1966) (judge to determine
existence or nonexistence of certain disputed preliminary facts). Thus, the California Evidence
Code did little to change the common law; it simply codified the practice in this state.
83. FED. R. EVID. 601. Under the federal rules, only judges and jurors are incompetent to
be witnesses in trials in which they are serving. See id. 605, 606. Other rules of evidence that
affect a witness' qualifications to testify are the requirements that the witness have personal
knowledge of the matter, id. 602, and that the witness declare that he or she will testify truth-
fully, id. 603.
84. MCCORMICK, supra note 31, at 168.
85. "A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to sup-
port a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter." FED. R. EvID. 602. For a
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tized witness renders that person incompetent to be a witness under any
provision of the Federal Rules of Evidence. To exclude testimony of a
witness simply because hypnosis was used to refresh his or her memory
may keep from the trier of fact evidence relevant to the determination of
guilt. That is not to say, however, that hypnotically refreshed testimony
should be admitted in all cases. Rather, the occurrence of a hypnotic
session should not in itself act as a barrier to the introduction of evi-
dence. While courts are correct in questioning the reliability of hypnoti-
cally induced recall, a per se rule declaring all previously hypnotized
witnesses incompetent is unfounded and will result in the exclusion of
relevant evidence.86
b. the Frye test
Courts have excluded hypnotically refreshed testimony based on the
lack of consensus in the scientific community regarding the reliability of
posthypnotic testimony as a matter of scientific fact. The admissibility of
testimony based upon scientific experimental procedures is governed by
the rule in Frye v. United States.87 In Frye, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals held that a scientific theory or procedure is admissible
if it has gained general acceptance in the scientific community.88 The
proponent of the experimental evidence in question bears the burden of
introducing expert testimony on the scientific community's acceptance of
the technique as reliable.
discussion of personal knowledge and the previously hypnotized witness, see infra notes 126-42
and accompanying text.
86. Barring the testimony of a criminal defendant who has been previously hypnotized
also interferes with the constitutional right to testify in one's own defense. See Rock, 107 S.
Ct. at 2710-11. For a discussion of Rock and the constitutional implications of restricting a
defendant's right to testify, see infra text accompanying notes 243-87.
87. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The court in Frye held inadmissible expert testimony
regarding the results of a systolic blood pressure deception test taken by the defendant. Id. at
1014.
88. In Frye, the court stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental
and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific princi-
ple or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.
Id. at 1014. The Frye test has been used to determine the admissiblity of evidence based on
polygraph examinations, truth serum, voice stress analysis, infrared sensing of aircraft, psycho-
logical profiles of battered women and experimental systems of blood typing, among other
procedures. For citations to cases relying on the Frye test, see MCCORMICK, supra note 3 1, at
606 & nn.6-15.
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The Frye test has been applied to cases involving the hypnosis of a
witness prior to trial for purposes of refreshing his or her recollection of
the event in question. Under Frye, hypnosis is regarded as an experimen-
tal scientific procedure, thereby requiring an evaluation of the consensus
in the community to ensure the reliability of the method and its ability to
aid the jury in reaching an accurate verdict. Most courts relying on Frye
have found posthypnotic testimony to be inadmissible, concluding that
hypnosis is not "generally accepted" in the scientific community as a reli-
able means of refreshing the recollection of its subject.8 9
The Frye test has been subject to varying interpretations and sub-
stantial criticism in recent years.90 This test may no longer be applicable
in light of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Certainly, state courts may
adopt the Frye test as the applicable standard for evaluating novel scien-
tific procedures. Federal courts and those state courts that have adopted
the federal rules,9 however, must recognize the possibility that Frye has
been superceded.
The Frye standard of acceptance of an experimental procedure in
the scientific community conflicts with the requirements for an expert
opinion under the Federal Rules of Evidence. 92 Frye requires "general
89. See, e.g., Collins, 132 Ariz. at 186, 644 P.2d at 1272 ("until hypnosis is recognized and
generally accepted in the scientific community as a reliable tool to enhance memory accurately
it is inadmissible in a criminal trial"); Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 54, 723 P.2d at 1375-76, 181 Cal.
Rptr. at 264 (testimony of previously hypnotized witness is inadmissible because proponent
did not prove compliance with Frye standard of admissibility); People v. Gonzales, 415 Mich.
615, 626, 329 N.W.2d 743, 748 (1982) ("Hypnosis has not received sufficient general accept-
ance in the scientific community to give reasonable assurance that the results produced under
even the best of circumstances will be sufficiently reliable to outweigh the risks of abuse or
prejudice."); Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 768 (under Frye, use of hypnosis to refresh recollection is
not scientifically reliable as accurate); Alsbach v. Bader, 700 S.W.2d 823, 830 (Mo. 1985)
(hypnosis does not currently meet Frye standard of reliability and accuracy); State v. Martin,
101 Wash. 2d 713, 719-20, 684 P.2d 651, 654 (1984) ("[a]bsent general scientific acceptance of
hypnosis as a reliable means of refreshing recollection, the dangers and possibilities of preju-
dice should preclude admission of evidence based upon it"). But see United States v. Harring-
ton, 18 M.J. 797, 802 (A.C.M.R. 1984) ("hypnotically-refreshed testimony satisfies the Fye
standard and is admissible in a criminal trial if the use of hypnosis in that case was reasonably
likely to result in recall comparable in accuracy to normal human memory"); Hurd, 86 N.J. at
538, 432 A.2d at 92 (use of hypnosis to refresh recollection satisfies Frye test as reasonably
reliable method when procedure is conducted with certain safeguards).
90. See MCCORMICK, supra note 31, at 606-09. See generally Giannelli. supra note 55.
91. A majority of states have adopted Federal Rule 702, governing the testimony by ex-
perts, either verbatim or with slight modification. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER. supra
note 81 § 702[06], at 702-31 to -39. For state adaptation of Rule 701, see id. § 702[06], at 702-
31 to -39 (1985 & Supp. 1987). "Rule 402 [which permits the admissibility of all relevant
evidence] has been adopted by the states without substantive change." Id. § 402[06]. at 402-
17. For state adaption of Rule 402, see id. § 402[06], at 402-17 to -28 (1985 & Supp. 1987).
92. FID. R. EVID. 703. In light of this conflict, it remains unclear whether Frye should be
controlling in determining the admissibility of novel scientific procedures. MCCORMICK, supra
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acceptance" within the scientific community before expert testimony on
experimental procedures may be deemed admissible. The federal rules,
on the other hand, permit experts to rely on otherwise inadmissible evi-
dence if that evidence is "reasonably relied upon by experts in the partic-
ular field... ,9' These standards are not synonymous.9" As its forensic
use becomes more widespread, the scientific community continues to de-
bate whether hypnosis is a reliable method of tapping a subject's mem-
ory. Because the scientific community has not yet "generally accepted"
the use of hypnosis for purposes of enhancing memory, the Frye test
mandates that its use be disallowed and any resultant testimony
excluded.
The Frye test, however, excludes evidence that is otherwise relevant
to the trier of fact's determination of issues based on the scientific evi-
dence. Professor McCormick, a chief opponent of the Frye standard of
admissibility, noted:
General scientific acceptance is a proper condition for taking
judicial notice of scientific facts, but it is not a suitable criterion
for the admissibility of scientific evidence. Any relevant con-
clusions supported by a qualified expert witness should be re-
ceived unless there are distinct reasons for exclusion. These
reasons are the familiar ones of prejudicing or misleading the
jury or consuming undue amounts of time.95
Thus, McCormick views the validity of a scientific technique as an aspect
of relevancy. The Federal Rules of Evidence concerning expert testi-
mony96 permit the introduction of any expert opinion that "will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue
... ,,97 The absence of the general acceptance standard of Frye, even in
the advisory committee's notes, "should be regarded as tantamount to an
abandonment of the general acceptance standard,"98 thereby leaving the
admissibility of any scientific procedure to the relevancy standards of the
federal rules.
Simply because substantial disagreement exists regarding the relia-
note 31, at 607 n.24; C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
EVIDENCE § 5168, at 91 (1978).
93. FED. R. EVID. -703.
94. MCCORMICK, supra note 31, at 607. But cf Hurd, 86 N.J. at 538, 432 A.2d at 92
(court found that Frye test was satisfied because "hypnosis is generally accepted as a reason-
ably reliable method of restoring a person's memory").
95. MCCORMICK, supra note 31, at 608 (footnotes omitted).
96. See FED. R. EVID. 702, 703.
97. FED. R. EvID. 702.
98. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 81, § 702[03], at 702-16 (footnote omitted).
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bility of hypnosis does not suggest that hypnotically induced evidence is
irrelevant and therefore should be excluded. The general scientific ac-
ceptance requirement of the Frye test could deprive the trier of fact of the
opportunity to hear testimony that is relevant to the determination of
guilt. The Federal Rules of Evidence, on the other hand, provide for the
admissibility of relevant evidence, 99 which is defined as "evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.' Therefore, as applied to expert testi-
mony on a scientific procedure, hypnotic testimony should be admitted if
it will assist the trier of fact in reaching its verdict, regardless of whether
the technique has been generally accepted by the scientific community.
This relevancy standard does not warrant admitting hypnotically in-
duced evidence every case. Based on the Federal Rules, the admissibility
of a novel scientific technique depends on the consideration of three fac-
tors: (1) the probative value of the evidence; (2) the dangers associated
with the technique; and (3) the probative value weighed against the dan-
gers.' 0 ' Thus, if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury,"102 Rule 403 provides for exclusion of the evidence, even if relevant.
Consequently, the Federal Rules mandate the admissibility of expert tes-
timony regarding the reliability of hypnosis as a method of refreshing
recollection, as well as testimony from a previously hypnotized witness,
unless it is proven that the prejudicial impact of such evidence outweighs
its probative value. 03
In the event that hypnosis testimony is admissible as being relevant,
the opposition can attempt to diminish its credibility by presenting expert
testimony regarding the potential dangers that arise out of any hypnotic
session. If this testimony proves that the dangers of a hypnotic session
are so conclusive as to render the evidence irrelevant, then all evidence
regarding the hypnosis should be excluded, including the subsequent tes-
timony of the previously hypnotized witness. If the dangers do not out-
99. FED. R. EVID. 402. See supra note 50 for evidentiary provisions which call for the
exclusion of relevant evidence.
100. FED. R. EvID. 401.
101. Giannelli, supra note 55, at 1235.
102. FED. R. EvID. 403; see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966). Both the federal
and California rules codified the common-law rule which permitted the exclusion of relevant
evidence at the discretion of the trial judge. See MCCORMICK, supra note 31, at 545: see also
Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evi-
dence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497 (1983).
103. See hifra notes 143-52 and accompanying text for further discussion of Rule 403.
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weigh the benefits of presenting hypnosis testimony to the trier of fact,
then the evidentiary rules favor its admissibility. The Frye requirement
of general acceptance within the scientific community is no longer a
workable method of determining the admissibility of hypnotically re-
freshed testimony. Instead, the inquiry should focus on the relevance of
the testimony of both the previously hypnotized witness and experts in
the field, thereby achieving a resolution which is in accord with the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence.
4. Ad hoc balancing approach
The recent trend in hypnosis cases is to determine the admissibility
of hypnotically refreshed testimony on an ad hoc basis.' °4 Recognizing
that the potential dangers of hypnosis do not affect the memory of the
witness in every case, the ad hoc method avoids the harsh results of a per
se rule of admissibility or inadmissibility. The trier of fact is free to con-
sider the reliability of the testimony of the previously hypnotized witness
in each case, resolving the issue in a manner dictated by the evidence,
rather than according to an inflexible standard.
Since the ad hoc method of determining admissibility does not ad-
here to rigid conclusions, courts following this approach have allowed for
both the admissibility and inadmissibility of hypnotically enhanced testi-
mony. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Kimber-
lin 105 adopted this theory as its primary approach to evaluating the
admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony, concluding in that case
that the hypnotically refreshed testimony was properly admitted. In
Kimberlin, the prosecution produced six witnesses who had undergone
hypnosis for purposes of refreshing their recollection of events surround-
ing a series of explosions that the defendant was suspected of commit-
ting. The lower court admitted the testimony of these witnesses but
cautioned the jury that the use of hypnosis on the witnesses did not war-
rant giving greater weight to their testimony. Further, the jury was free
to evaluate the impact of hypnosis on the witness' memory and ability to
remember correctly. 06 The defendant was convicted of twenty-two
counts of a thirty-four count indictment.
0 7
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit evaluated the potential dangers in-
volved in the use of hypnosis and surveyed judicial responses to these
104. See supra note 46.
105. 805 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3270 (1987).
106. Id. at 216-17.
107. Id. at 215.
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dangers, but found them unpersuasive.108 Although the court recognized
that witnesses "may be led to testify beyond their genuine memory," it
was unlikely that the dangers of suggestion or confabulation affected the
jury's verdict. 0 9 Concluding that the admission of the testimony of the
hypnotized witnesses did not affect a substantial right of the defendant,
the court found support in various factors: the strength of evidence
against the defendant apart from the testimony of the previously hypno-
tized witnesses, the lack of any effect of hypnosis on the key witness, the
lack of any enhanced recall as a result of hypnosis, the consistency be-
tween the testimony and prehypnosis statements and the likelihood that
the jury's verdict would have remained the same even if the testimony
was restricted to prehypnosis recall.11 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the
defendant's conviction."'
Recently, the Eighth Circuit used a similar method of balancing the
factors favoring and disfavoring the admissibility of testimony of a previ-
ously hypnotized witness, concluding that the evidence should not be
permitted. Little v. Armontrout 1 2 involved the admissibility of eyewit-
ness testimony of a rape victim. The victim saw her assailant only
briefly, viewing a partial right profile of his face for anywhere from two
to sixty seconds." 3 When the victim was able to provide only a general
description of her assailant's build, she agreed to undergo hypnosis in
order to enhance her recall of his identity. 1 4 Within three months after
the hypnosis, the victim viewed three photographic displays but only
once did she pick someone who resembled her assailant." 5 Later, the
victim underwent hypnosis for a second time, this time to aid in her
sleeping. Shortly thereafter, four months after her attack, the victim
picked the defendant out of a photographic display and again in a lineup.
The defendant was convicted and the state supreme court affirmed." 16
Relying on the standards for determining the reliability of eyewit-
ness identification established by the United States Supreme Court,' " the
Eighth Circuit concluded that the victim's identification of the defendant
108. Id. at 217-19.
109. Id. at 219.
110. Id. at 223 (citing FED. R. EVID. 103(a)).
111. Id. at 254.
112. 819 F.2d 1425 (8th Cir. 1987).
113. Id. at 1426.
114. Id. at 1427. The hypnosis session was conducted by Officer B.J. Lincecum of the Cape
Giradeau Police Department.
115. Id. The defendant's photo was not included in these displays.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1433 (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977): Neil v. Biggers, 409
U.S. 188, 199 (1972); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968); Stoval v. Denno,
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was constitutionally unreliable. " 8 The court in Little recognized that the
victim did in fact see her assailant, sufficient lighting was available for
her to view him and she made an unequivocal identification of the de-
fendant on several occasions. Other factors, however, tainted her identi-
fication: the victim admitted that she avoided staring at her assailant for
fear of being physically harmed and her initial description did not de-
scribe the defendant, differing substantially as to his age, weight and
height.' ' 9 Additionally, the court noted that the victim's testimony was
uncorroborated, she was able to identify the defendant only after hypno-
sis and the fingerprints found at the scene did not match the defend-
ant's.'20 Weighing all of these factors, the court concluded that the use
of her testimony at trial violated the defendant's right to due process of
law.
12 1
The fact that these two courts reached different results after consid-
ering the factors in each case brings to light the flexibility of an ad hoc
balancing approach. While the negative influences of hypnosis may taint
the memory of a witness to such an extent that his or her testimony is
rendered unreliable, so may the exclusion of such testimony interfere
with the administration of justice. The adoption of a balancing approach
to the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony will enable courts
to evaluate the influence of the use of hypnosis on that particular case
and avoid the harsh results of a per se rule of admissibility or inadmissi-
bility. The use of such a case by case analysis should not consume any
388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967)). For a discussion of eyewitness identification and the use of hypno-
sis, see infra notes 204-26 and accompanying text.
118. 819 F.2d at 1433.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1435.
121. Id. at 1434-35. While Little was a criminal case of first impression in that circuit, the
court cited to an earlier civil case which addressed the admissibility of hypnotically enhanced
testimony on an ad hoc basis. In Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp.. 771 F.2d 1112 (8th
Cir. 1985), the court considered the following factors in determining the admissibility of hyp-
notically refreshed testimony: whether and to what degree procedural safeguards were fol-
lowed, the appropriateness of using hypnosis in light of the memory loss involved and whether
corroborating evidence exists. Id. at 1123. The court must consider all of the circumstances
involved, whether the testimony is reliable and whether the probative value outweighs the
prejudicial impact before determining the admissibility of the testimony. Id. The court noted:
"It is our hope that this case-by-case method of determining the admissibility of hypnotically
enhanced testimony will guard against the problems of hypnosis, especially undue suggestive-
ness and confabulation, but also allow for the inclusion of reliable refreshed memory which
hypnosis can at times under certain circumstances produce." Id.
In light of the differing burden of proof and the constitutional issues which arise ill crimi-
nal cases, the court in Little did not adopt the Sprynczynatyk test. The court did. however, find
this ad hoc method to be useful in establishing guidelines for determining the reliability of such
evidence when presented in a criminal trial. 819 F.2d at 1432 n.20.
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greater amount of time than the more established theories of admissibil-
ity since the introduction of expert testimony regarding the influences of
hypnosis will probably remain the same."' This method.of determining
admissibility of testimony of a previously hypnotized witness frees the
courts from unnecessary constraints and provides for an equitable resolu-
tion of the issue.
B. Evidentiary Objections to the Use of Hypnosis
The common-law methods of excluding and admitting testimony of
a previously hypnotized witness are not consistent with the Federal
Rules of Evidence,' 23 which ensure that only reliable and relevant evi-
dence is considered by the trier of fact. Although the reliability of hyp-
nosis is not explicitly addressed in the Federal Rules of Evidence,
24
other evidentiary objections may be applied to the introduction of hypno-
sis testimony. Objections based on personal knowledge and Rule 403, as
well as hearsay,125 can serve to exclude evidence that is rendered unrelia-
ble due to the influence of the hypnotic session. Absent legislation gov-
erning the admissibility of testimony from a previously hypnotized
witness, these evidentiary objections provide equally effective means for
excluding potentially unreliable, hypnotically induced testimony. Until
the scientific community offers a conclusive statement that hypnosis is an
accurate means of refreshing recollection, the use of these objections can
ensure that the criminal defendant will be convicted on nothing less than
reliable evidence.
1. Personal knowledge
Perhaps the most logical evidentiary objection to hypnotically re-
freshed testimony is that the witness may not be testifying from firsthand
knowledge. As a result of the dangers of suggestibility and confabula-
tion, the previously hypnotized subject may not have actually perceived
122. But see Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2716 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("requiring the matter to
be considered res nova by every single trial judge in every single case might seem to some to
pose serious administrative difficulties").
123. See supra notes 79-86 & 87-103 and accompanying text for a criticism of incompetency
and the Frye test, respectively, as bases for excluding hypnosis testimony and notes 52-58 and
accompanying text for a discussion of credibility of the previously hypnotized witness.
124: State courts, however, are free to develop their own evidentiary rules governing the
admissibility of such testimony. California and Oregon have enacted such rules. CAL. EVID.
CODE § 795 (West Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 136.675, 136.685, 136.695 (1985). See
supra note 61 for a discussion of these sections.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 177-202 for a discussion of hearsay and the use of
hypnosis.
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those matters he or she now claims to remember.' 26 Thus, the trier of
fact may be misled by inaccurate evidence submitted by a previously hyp-
notized witness.
The Federal Rules of Evidence require that a witness have personal
knowledge of a subject as a prerequisite to the admissibility of his or her
testimony. 27 The rationale behind this rule presupposes that observa-
tions through one's own senses are reliable;' 28 the witness may be pre-
sumed to know what was experienced through the senses. But the
witness' observations through the senses and a strict interpretation of the
term "knowledge" are not necessarily the same.' 29 As noted by Dean
Wigmore:
[A] witness cannot be assumed beforehand, by the law, to know
things; the most it can assume is that he thinks he knows ....
Accordingly, the rules upon the subject in hand are all con-
cerned, not strictly with the witness' knowledge, but with his
opportunities of observing and his actual observation. 130
Thus, to ensure that a witness observed the event in question
through the senses, an adequate foundation should be laid before ac-
cepting a witness' purported knowledge of the subject matter. The pro-
ponent must establish that the witness had an adequate opportunity to
observe, that he or she was able to obtain correct impressions of the event
and that the witness is able to apply both experience and observation to
correctly characterize the event in question. 13 1 Wigmore defines three
126. See supra notes 13-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of suggestibility and
confabulation.
127. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 602 provides that "[a] witness may not testify to a
matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowl-
edge of the matter." FED. R. EvID. 602. This provision is subject to the rules regarding
opinion testimony by an expert witness. See FED. R. EvID. 703.
A majority of states have adopted the federal rule on personal knowledge, either verbatim
or without substantial modification. For states' adaptation of Rule 602, see 3 J. WEINSTI:N &
M. BERGER, supra note 81, § 602[04], at 602-10 to -12 (1985 & Supp. 1987).
128. MCCORMICK, supra note 31, at 23.
129. "Even if the most trustworthy of men assures me that he knows things are thus and so,
this by itself cannot satisfy me that he does know. Only that he believes he knows .... The
difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing." L. WiTTGENSTEIN, ON CI:R-
TAINTY 20e, 24e (1969) (emphasis in original).
130. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 650 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979) (emphasis in original).
131. Wigmore draws a distinction between experience and observation:
By Observation is meant that direction of attention which is the source of impres-
sions, and thus of knowledge. The distinction between Experience and Obervation is
that the former concerns the mental power or capacity to acquire knowledge ol tile
subject of testimony, while the latter concerns the actual exercise of intelligence upon
the subject of testimony. Admission as a witness is inconceivable withonut the pres-
ence of both these elements.
WIGMORE, supra note 130, at § 651 (emphasis in original).
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corollaries to the general principle of knowledge: (1) that the witness
characterize the impressions based on observations from his or her own
senses; 132 (2) that the witness need not state his or her observations with
absolute certainty; 133 and (3) that the observations must have adequate
data as the basis for the inference."' The satisfaction of the preliminary
fact of a witness' firsthand knowledge necessarily involves a proper show-
ing of these corollaries before a witness may testify.
When a witness has undergone hypnosis for purposes of refreshing
recollection in anticipation of providing testimony at a criminal trial, the
witness' personal knowledge of the event becomes suspect. Even if the
previously hypnotized witness testifies that he or she had an opportunity
to observe, such statements do not ensure that the testimony is based on
the witness' actual observations. 135 The potential dangers of hypnosis
may supplement the witness' memory. If the witness proceeds to testify
to those details in his or her posthypnotic memory, a danger exists that
the witness does not in fact have personal knowledge of those matters.
Therefore, the previously hypnotized witness may not meet Wigmore's
corollaries for establishing firsthand knowledge and the admissibility of
the witness' testimony should be questioned.
132. Id. at § 657. If the witness reports the observations of others, the testimony may be
excluded on the grounds of hearsay. Id. For a further discussion of hearsay and hypnosis, see
supra text accompanying notes 177-202. 1
133. Id. at § 658. The witness is permitted to testify to a "belief" or "impression" if it is in
reference to the degree of positiveness of the original observation or signifies the degree of
positiveness of the witness' recollection. If the "belief" or "impression" suggests that the wit-
ness lacks actual personal observation or simply states an opinion, then the testimony may be
excluded as not adequately based on personal knowledge. Id.
134. Id. at § 659. "[T]he law may reject testimony which appears to be founded on data so
scanty that the witness' alleged inferences from them may at once be pronounced absurd or
extreme." Id.
135. The rules of evidence permit the witness to establish personal knowledge through his
or her own testimony. FED. R. EVID. 602. "[P]ersonal knowledge is not an absolute but may
consist of what the witness thinks he knows from personal perception." FED. R. EvID. 602
advisory committee's notes (citing 2 WIcMORE, EVIDENCE § 650). "In laying this foundation
of knowledge, it is allowable for the examiner to elicit from the witness the particular circum-
stances which led him to notice or observe or remember the fact." MCCORMICK, supra note
31, at 24 (footnote omitted). The drafters of the rules did not contemplate the use of hypnosis
and its effects on a witness' memory when codifying the requirements for personal knowledge;
the ability of the previously hypnotized witness to satisfy the requirements for personal knowl-
edge is deceiving. In hypnosis cases, limitations must be placed on a witness' ability to estab-
lish firsthand knowledge by his or her testimony. The nature of hypnosis-and the very reason
for questioning the personal knowledge of a previously hypnotized witness-is such that the
witness may not have actually perceived that to which he or she now testifies. The proponent
of the evidence should be required to establish that the facts to which the witness testifies are
within his or her personal knowledge, but proof of that knowledge should be provided by
evidence other than the witness' own testimony.
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For example, the prosecution presents a witness who was allegedly
an eyewitness to a robbery. This witness may have had incomplete recol-
lection of the event and was hypnotized by the police prior to her identifi-
cation of the defendant. When the witness testifies, she is able to
characterize her observation based upon her senses, the first corollary;
she may have seen the culprit as he ran from the store, or heard him
speak during the course of the criminal act. The witness, however, may
be unsure of the accuracy of her initial observations or her memory of
the event in general. Simply because she expresses some uncertainty
would not be enough to preclude testimony based upon the witness'
knowledge of the event.136 Absent an indication that the uncertainty re-
flects a lack of actual personal perception, Wigmore's second corollary
would permit the introduction of the witness' testimony.
Fulfillment of the third corollary, which requires that the witness
base her inference on adequate data, becomes questionable when the wit-
ness has been hypnotized. The dangers of suggestibility and confabula-
tion are such that the witness may not have actually perceived the event
in question. She may never have had the opportunity to clearly see the
robber that night, due to the distance between the robber and the witness,
the witness' poor eyesight or the fact that the robber never in fact faced
the witness at all. The witness may be drawing on her imagination for
details rather than on data acquired from actual sensory observations, or,
in an effort to cooperate, she may have been responding to the subtle
questioning of a partial questioner. Thus, the witness may not have
based her testimony on her personal knowledge of the event as it actually
occurred.
This possibility becomes most apparent when the witness' memory
greatly improves as a result of the hypnosis. Previously, the witness may
have been unable to provide a detailed description, but after hypnosis is
able to recall a great deal. In this situation, the possibility that the wit-
ness is testifying from less than personal knowledge is greatly increased,
particularly when the witness is unable to factually credit his or her post-
hypnosis memory. If the witness' story cannot be sufficiently corrobo-
rated or supplemented by satisfactory proof of the witness' personal
knowledge, the court should entertain an objection based on the witness'
lack of firsthand knowledge and the testimony should be excluded.
136. While the law does demand personal knowledge, testimony will not be excluded sim-
ply because the witness' knowledge may be imprecise. "Accordingly .... th[ere] will be no
ground of objection if it appears that he merely speaks from an inattentive observation, or an
unsure memory, though it will if the expressions are found to mean that he speaks from conjec-
ture or from hearsay." MCCORMICK, supra note 31, at 25 (footnotes omitted).
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While an objection to hypnotically refreshed testimony based on
lack of personal knowledge may be the most accurate, the practicality of
sustaining such an objection is problematic. Although a danger exists
that the witness may be testifying to matters that are not within his or
her personal knowledge but are in fact fruits of the hypnotic session, this
situation may not always exist. The hypnotic session may not affect the
substance or accuracy of the subject's memory at all, or may do so to a
negligible extent. If the use of hypnosis enhances the witness' memory,
the possibility exists that the procedure has resulted in accurate recollec-
tion.137 Additionally, the exclusion of a witness' testimony on the mere
possibility that his or her memory is tainted is contrary to the admissibil-
ity standards established by the federal rules, which require the most
minimal burden to establish personal knowledge.
1 38
One solution to these problems is to adapt the burden of proof re-
quired to establish personal knowledge to meet the unique dangers posed
by the use of hypnosis. The Federal Rules of Evidence permit the testi-
mony of a witness whenever the proponent introduces evidence "suffi-
cient to support a finding" that he or she does indeed have personal
knowledge. 139 Since the dangers of hypnosis are such that knowledge of
the witness is in question, this minimal standard should be raised to a
more stringent burden of proof. The proponent should be required to
establish personal knowledge by a preponderence of the evidence in cases
involving testimony of a previously hypnotized witness. By raising the
burden of proof in hypnosis cases, unreliable evidence is excluded
140
while adequately proven evidence reflecting the witness' personal knowl-
137. However, as noted above, separating the true facts from those improperly supplanted
by hypnosis may be impossible. See text accompanying note 17.
138. See Fed. R. Evid. 602.
139. Id.
140. The role of the judge is not to exclude evidence based on lack of personal knowledge if
it is merely improbable that the witness actually has knowledge of the disputed event; rather,
".near impossibility" or "so improbably that no reasonable person could believe" should be the
test. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 81, § 602[02], at 602-5; cf. 3 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, supra note 81, § 602[02], at 602-4 to -5 (" 'It is only when no reasonable trier of
fact could believe that the witness perceived what he claims to have perceived that the court
may reject the testimony. Not improbability but impossibility is the test.' ") (quoting E. MOR-
GAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 59-60 (1962)). In hypnosis cases, the opponent of the
testimony may introduce evidence which establishes, for instance, that the witness never had
the opportunity to observe the event. Under Weinstein's test of near impossibility, the evi-
dence could be excluded. If, however, the witness did have an opportunity to perceive and
only some doubt exists as to the witness' ability to observe in such detail or with such cer-
tainty, then the courts clearly favor admitting the testimony, leaving to the trier of fact the
issue of credibility. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of credibility
and the previously hypnotized witness.
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edge is admitted. 141 Any lesser standard of proof would invite the intro-
duction of unreliable evidence, the very danger to be eliminated.
The proponent of the evidence may establish personal knowledge by
proving that the substance of the witness' testimony clearly falls within
the knowledge of that witness. The proponent must show not only that
the witness had an opportunity to perceive the event in question, but that
he or she did in fact perceive it as such and is presently characterizing
these observations accurately. This may be demonstrated through the
introduction of corroborating evidence to support the witness' testimony.
Further, any inconsistencies in the witness' pre- and posthypnotic ver-
sions of the event must be addressed and resolved,' 42 firmly establishing
that the testimony is based on the witness' personal knowledge.
When the witness experiences a change in memory as a result of the
hypnosis, a danger exists that the witness is testifying to matters not
based on personal knowledge. So long as the use of hypnosis as a means
of refreshing recollection is questioned, an objection based on the lack of
personal knowledge should be considered, requiring a greater burden on
the proponent before the evidence is admitted. If the proponent is unable
to meet this modified burden of proof, then the court should sustain the
objection, keeping such unreliable evidence from the trier of fact.
2. Balancing prejudicial impact against probative value
As discussed above, the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony should not be subject to the nebulous "general admissibility" stan-
dard of the Frye test, but is more properly a question of relevancy. 
43
However, even if hypnotically enhanced testimony is legally relevant
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, this does not permit the admissibil-
ity of such evidence in every case. Rather, its probative value must be
141. "The judge must admit the testimony even though the witness is not positive about
what he perceived provided the witness had an opportunity to observe and obtained some
impressions from his observations." 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 81, § 602[02],
at 602-6.
142. Thus, some means of measuring the change in memory after hypnosis must be estab-
lished. It is essential that the witness' version of the event in question be accurately recorded
and memorialized in a writing or other recordation prior to the hypnotic session. The witness
should be required to sign and swear to the accuracy of this version of their prehypnosis mem-
ory before being subjected to hypnosis to establish a complete record against which the wit-
ness' testimony at trial may be compared. This precaution is also recognized as one of the
safeguards designed to curb the contaminating effects of hypnosis. See supra notes 59-70 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the use of safeguards in determining the admissibility of
posthypnotic testimony.
143. See supra notes 87-103 and accompanying text for a discussion of the viability of the
Frye test in light of the rules of evidence and its relation to the use of hypnosis in criminal
trials.
HYPNOSIS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
weighed against any potential prejudicial impact that may result from
allowing the jury to hear such evidence. A number of hypnosis cases
have relied on this balancing of interests contained in Rule 403 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 1" Weighing the costs and benefits requires
careful consideration of the potential dangers involved in hypnotizing a
witness for purposes of refreshing his or her memory and the impact of
such evidence on the sensibilities of the jury.
The potential probative value of a previously hypnotized witness'
testimony is obvious; the witness is on the stand because he or she is able
to recall (although possibly as a result of the hypnosis) relevant informa-
tion that may play a role in the trier of fact's determination of guilt.
Given the potential influence of suggestibility, confabulation and over-
confidence, however, the prejudicial impact of hypnotically refreshed tes-
timony could be great. In general, when dealing with scientific
procedures there exists "an aura of scientific infallibility [that] may
shroud the evidence and thus lead the jury to accept it without critical
scrutiny."' 45 Thus, whether the jury is realistically able to see through
the scientific procedure and consider the substance of the testimony given
is a crucial issue.
Rule 403 deems evidence inadmissible whenever the prejudicial im-
pact "substantially outweigh[s]" any benefits derived from admitting the
evidence.' 46 The key question when considering the admissibility of hyp-
notically refreshed testimony under Rule 403 is whether the dangers in-
herent in the technique "substantially outweigh" the value of the
testimony. The influence of an overly confident witness who possesses
144. See, e.g., United States v. Charles, 561 F. Supp. 694, 697 (S.D. Tex. 1983) ("while [the]
evidence is relevant, its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice to the Defendants and should therefore be excluded"); Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d
129, 136 (Alaska 1986) (if Frye test were not applied, hypnotically adduced testimony would
be excluded under Evidence Rule 403 for being more prejudicial than probative); State v.
Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 691, 643 P.2d 246, 255 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (under 403 analysis,
hypnosis found to be reasonably reliable method of refreshing witness' recollection); see also
United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1202 (5th Cir. 1984) ("The jury's assumptions con-
cerning the nature of memory and the accuracy of hypnosis may make the testimony so preju-
dicial that its weight is impossible to overcome"); State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132
Ariz. 180, 199, 644 P.2d 1266, 1285 (1982) (supplemental opinion), overruled on other grounds
by State v. Nunez, 135 Ariz. 257, 660 P.2d 858 (1983) (case by case analysis of whether danger
of prejudice outweighs probative value found to be unworkable because of possibility of con-
flicting decisions and consumption of trial resources; Frye held to be appropriate threshhold
test).
A majority of states have adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 403, either verbatim or with-
out substantial modification. For state's adaptation of Rule 403, see 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 403[07], at 403-102 to -137 (1985 & Supp. 1987).
145. See Giannelli, supra note 55, at 1237.
146. FED. R. EVID. 403.
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the mysterious ability to recall all that transpired on the occasion in
question presents a significant problem. Although the jury may be in-
structed on the dangers inherent in the use of hypnosis on a witness, the
witness' confidence and ability to recall details of the event may be so
overly impressive that the warning may fall on deaf ears. 147 This holds
true even if the content of the witness' testimony fails to bear any relation
to the events as they truly happened.
But does the potentially misleading demeanor of an overconfident
witness "substantially outweigh" the relevance of the testimony?
McCormick notes several factors to consider when weighing the admissi-
bility of relevant evidence under Rule 403. First, one must consider the
danger of prejudice-not merely damage to the case or an appeal to the
emotions, but whether "[a] juror influenced in this fashion may be satis-
fied with a slightly less compelling demonstration of guilt than he should
be." ' 48 Second, the evidence may produce an emotional reaction of such
magnitude that it may confuse or mislead the jury. Third, the impact of
the evidence may detract the jury from the main issues. Fourth, the in-
troduction of the evidence may consume too much time. 1'4 9
An analysis of these factors indicates that the prejudice caused by
admitting testimony of a previously hypnotized witness may substan-
tially outweigh the benefits of admitting the evidence, particularly when
the witness has experienced a change in memory after hypnosis. With
respect to the first factor, the danger of possibly prejudicing the jury is
great in a criminal case where the liberty of the accused is in the hands of
the trier of fact. Second, the jury may accept at face value the overconfi-
dent, detailed testimony of a previously hypnotized witness. This could
lead a jury to return a guilty verdict, concluding that the prosecution's
burden has been met, when, in reality, the case against the accused se-
verely lacks substantiation. Although the defense can attempt to dimin-
ish the credibility of the hypnotic testimony by arguing that it consists of
confabulated fantasy rather than fact, this would be a truly difficult task.
The third factor may also be implicated because hypnotic testimony can
distract the jury from the true reliability of the evidence presented and,
therefore, may improperly influence the jury as to the guilt of the defend-
ant. As to the fourth factor, the expert testimony required to inform the
147. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) ("there are some contexts in
which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the conse-
quences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury
system cannot be ignored").
148. MCCORMICK, supra note 31, at 545 (footnote omitted).
149. Id. at 545-46.
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jury about the potential dangers of hypnosis unduly burdens the judicial
system in that it results in the consumption of the courts' resources while
often shedding relatively little light on the truth.
50
Certainly, the use of hypnosis will not always adversely affect the
witness' demeanor or the content of his or her memory. The goal of the
hypnotic session may, in fact, be successful in restoring the true memory
of the subject. In such a case, the relevancy of the evidence is clearly
paramount and warrants its admission. In evaluating hypnosis cases,
however, it is difficult to recognize when the testimony has been nega-
tively impacted, thereby calling for its exclusion. An objection based on
Rule 403 is much more flexible than strict theories of admissibility or
inadmissibility in that it focuses on the costs and benefits of the hypnoti-
cally enhanced testimony in each case before ruling on its admissibility.
The proponent may rebut claims of unfair prejudice by presenting evi-
dence corroborating the witness' story, comparing the witness' pre- and
posthypnosis memory or introducing reliable independent evidence
against the accused. When presented with a challenge based on Rule
403, the court may consider the possibility of the ill effects of hypnosis in
that case and rule accordingly.
15'
In a criminal trial, the admission of untrustworthy evidence has seri-
ous consequences for the accused. "The introduction of unreliable evi-
dence that has a significant potential to influence a jury greatly increases
the likelihood of an erroneous verdict." '152 Still, relevant evidence should
not be excluded based only upon a possibility that the witness' testimony
was negatively impacted. Through the use of an objection based on Rule
403, the trier of fact can weigh the benefits and burdens of introducing
the testimony of a previously hypnotized witness, thereby retaining a
flexible standard for ruling on its admissibility which is in accord with
the Federal Rules of Evidence.
150. One commentator noted:
One of the main reasons for prohibiting the use of post-hypnotic facts is that educat-
ing juries as to the effects of hypnosis has proven insufficient to compensate for the
defendant's loss of cross-examination. Such attempts to educate the jurors frequently
degenerate into swearing contests between rival experts and are ineffective in dispel-
ling popular misconceptions of hypnotic recall. Moreover, no amount of jury educa-
tion can protect a defendant when the prosecutor uses hypnosis to "create" a
confident and seemingly reliable witness out of a previously unbelievable character.
Mickenberg, supra note 53, at 972.
151. Rule 403 has been criticized for allowing too much discretion in excluding prejudicial
evidence, undermining the goals of predictability and uniformity of evidence law. See gener-
ally Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 59 (1984).
152. Giannelli, supra note 55, at 1246.
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C. The Rules of Evidence and the Admissibility of Hypnosis
Testimony in Criminal Trials
Until the scientific community resolves the issue of reliability, courts
will continue to grapple with the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed
testimony. At present, the reliability of hypnosis as a method of enhanc-
ing recall is rightfully questioned. Yet, the total exclusion of such evi-
dence may unnecessarily hamper the efficient administration of the
criminal justice system. Rather than simply relying on each state's reso-
lution of the issue, courts should seek a more consistent method of deter-
mining admissibility consistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence. The
present theories of admissibility should be reevaluated in terms of the
evidentiary rules. Through the use of objections provided by the federal
rules, courts may find alternative methods of determining the admissibil-
ity of hypnotically induced testimony. This may pave the way to a more
uniform method of judging the reliability of hypnosis testimony until the
area is more clearly defined.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE USE OF HYPNOSIS IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS
Whenever hypnotically enhanced testimony is offered in a criminal
trial, the trier of fact must consider the probative value of the evidence as
well as the potentially contaminating influences of hypnosis, whether the
evidence is introduced by the prosecution or the defense. The Bill of
Rights, however, guarantees criminal defendants certain protections
which are not extended to the government. While preservation of the
truth-determining process is of utmost priority, special consideration of
the criminal defendant's constitutional rights may warrant the extension
of unique privileges. When the prosecution seeks to introduce testimony
of a pfeviously hypnotized witness, certain due process and confrontation
issues must enter into the equation and may weigh in favor of excluding
the evidence. On the other hand, when the testimony of a previously
hypnotized witness-is offered by the defendant, the rights guaranteed the
accused by the due process and confrontation clauses may justify the ad-
mission of the witness' testimony. Thus, when hypnosis is used in a
criminal trial, its constitutionality must be considered in light of whether
the prosecution or the defense is offering the evidence, keeping in mind
the unique privileges reserved for the criminally accused.
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A. Use of Hypnosis by the Prosecution
When the prosecution seeks to introduce testimony of a previously
hypnotized witness, the interests served by admitting the evidence must
be weighed against the constitutional rights of the criminal defendant.
First, care must be taken that the testimony does not violate the criminal
defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him, particularly
when encountering "the overconfident witness" or when the witness has
had his or her memory substantially changed as a result of hypnosis.
Second, the court must evaluate the prosecution's use of hypnosis as a
method of refreshing the memory of a witness in light of the criminal
defendant's due process rights. Here, the use of hypnosis as an identifica-
tion procedure and its good faith use as a forensic tool require careful
consideration. If the use of hypnosis in the prosecution's case violates
the defendant's constitutional rights to confrontation of witnesses or due
process of law, the case against the accused has been irreparably tainted
and warrants reversal.1
53
1. The constitutional right to confrontation of witnesses
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
153. See, e.g., State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 232, 624 P.2d 1274, 1280 (1981) (defendant's
conviction of aggravated assault reversed; court persuaded that reasonable probability existed
that jury would have reached different verdict if previously hypnotized victim's testimony had
been properly excluded); People v. Guerra, 37 Cal. 3d 385, 429, 690 P.2d 635, 665, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 162, 191 (1984) (prejudicial error for trial court to admit testimony of rape victim who
was able to recall act of penetration only after hypnosis and whose testimony was virtually sole
incriminating evidence against criminal defendants); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 71-72,
723 P.2d 1354, 1387, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 274-75, cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1125, cert. denied, 459
U.S. 860 (1982) (judgment reversed; witness' testimony regarding events that were subject of
hypnosis should be excluded); People v. Rex, 689 P.2d 669, 671 (Colo. App. 1984), later pro-
ceeding, Rex v. Teeples, 753 F.2d 840 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 967 (1985)
(reversible error for trial court to admit testimony of kidnapping victim who identified defend-
ant at trial even though she was unable to identify him at two prior trials); Peterson v. State,
448 N.E.2d 673, 679 (Ind. 1983) (trial court reversibly erred by admitting testimony of previ-
ously hypnotized witness who was able to identify defendant only after being hypnotized);
People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 545, 453 N.E.2d 484, 495, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255, 266 (1983)
(defendant entitled to new trial because lower court incorrectly permitted witness to testify to
matters revealed after hypnosis); State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 535, 319 S.E.2d 177, 189
(1984) (reversible error since reasonable possibility existed that jury would have reached differ-
ent verdict had testimony of previously hypnotized witness/accomplice not been erroneously
admitted); State v. Martin, 101 Wash. 2d 713, 723, 684 P.2d 651, 656 (1984) (defendant's
conviction reversed because witness was unable to remember anything prior to hypnosis; with-
out this witness' testimony, evidence against defendant was circumstantial, at best); see also
State v. Long, 32 Wash. App. 732, 737-38, 649 P.2d 845, 847 (1982) (case against defendant
was dismissed when prosecution hypnotized defense witness on eve of trial to obtain inculpa-
tory evidence against defendant, precluding defendant from questioning his witness without
taint of hypnosis).
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every criminal defendant the right to confront the witnesses against
him.'54 "IT]he mission of the Confrontation Clause is to advance a prac-
tical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in crimi-
nal trials by assuring that 'the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for
evaluating the truth of the prior statement.' "155 Thus, the right of con-
frontation generally guarantees the opportunity for meaningful and effec-
tive cross-examination of those witnesses testifying against the ac-
cused.' 5 6 The United States Supreme Court summarized this fundamen-
tal right as follows:
Confrontation: (1) insures that the witness will give his state-
ments under oath-thus impressing him with the seriousness of
the matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of pen-
alty for perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-exami-
nation, the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth"; (3) permits the jury that is to decide the
defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in mak-
ing his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his
credibility. 57
This right of confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses is an ele-
ment of due process' 58 and is guaranteed to every criminal defendant.
When a criminal defendant confronts a witness who has experienced
some alteration in memory due to the use of hypnosis, questioning by the
accused may be ineffective in discrediting the witness. The potential for
constitutional violation arises in two circumstances: (1) when hypnosis
alters the demeanor of a witness, creating overconfidence in the witness'
154. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right to confront one's accusers applies only to criminal
proceedings and may be raised only by the criminally accused. MCCORMICK, supra note 31, at
749. The federal confrontation clause provision has been made obligatory upon the states.
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
155. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
161 (1970)); see also State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 569, 329 N.W.2d 386, 394, cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 946 (1983).
156. See generally Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
284 (1973); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968);
Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S, 415 (1965); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); see also MCCORMICK, supra note 31, at 47-48.
157. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367
(Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974)); see also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724 (1968) ("The right to
confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the opportunity to cross-examine and
the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness.").
158. See Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931). For a discus-
sion of the origins of the confrontation clause and the infamous 17th century trial of Sir Walter
Raleigh, see Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh
Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 100 (1972).
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testimony and (2) when a witness' version of an event substantially
changes as a result of hypnosis. In these two situations, the constitu-
tional rights of the defendant must be carefully weighed against the rele-
vancy of the evidence.
a. confrontation and the overconfident witness
As discussed above,' 59 one possible effect of hypnosis is that the sub-
ject may experience increased confidence in his or her "memory" of an
event, even if that "memory" is not founded on personal knowledge.
1 60
This false confidence may alter the witness' demeanor, potentially block-
ing the defendant's attempts to ascertain the truth through cross-
examination. 1
61
Courts disagree whether alteration in the witness' demeanor as a
result of hypnosis violates a criminal defendant's constitutional right to
confront the witnesses against him. Those courts finding a constitutional
violation 162 note that the potential dangers inherent in the use of hypno-
sis can undermine the defendant's ability to cross-examine.
[T]he hypnotic subject, upon awakening, is often imbued with a
confidence and conviction as to his memory which was not
present before. Pre-hypnosis uncertainty becomes molded, in
light of additional recall experienced under hypnosis, into certi-
159. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of overconfidence.
160. See supra notes 126-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of personal knowledge.
161. "Some authorities have considered this 'tampering' with the witness's demeanor to
effectively render the witness permanently unavailable for cross-examination, and conclude
that [the witness'] testimony at trial is the equivalent of hearsay and constitutes a violation of
the defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him." State v. Contreras, 674 P.2d 792,
796 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 718 P.2d 129 (Alaska 1986). See also Rock v. Arkansas, 107
S. Ct. 2704, 2713 (1987), where the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that cross-
examination of an overconfident witness is "more difficult" as a result of hypnosis.
162. See, e.g., Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 139 (Alaska 1986) (alteration in demeanor
of previously hypnotized witness denies defendants constitutional right of confrontation); State
ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 189, 644 P.2d 1266, 1275 (1982), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Nunez, 135 Ariz. 257, 660 P.2d 858 (1983) ("Because of the unrelia-
bility of posthypnotic testimony and the denial of the defendant's fundamental right to effec-
tive cross-examination, posthypnotic testimony is inadmissible in a criminal trial"); State v.
Joblin, 107 Idaho 351, 355, 689 P.2d 767, 771 (1984) (cross-examination of witness who is
overly confident due to hypnotic session is meaningless); Peterson v. State, 448 N.E.2d 673,
678 (Ind. 1983) (key witness identified defendant only after hypnosis and was unable to pro-
vide any factual basis for identification; introduction of his testimony denied defendant his
right to confrontation and cross-examination); State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 526, 319 S.E.2d
177, 184 (1984) ("Since a previously hypnotized witness has no recollection of the procedure
itself, the defendant is unable to question him about the hypnotic process and his right of
confrontation on this point is completely frustrated. Effective cross-examination is. further-
more, nearly impossible when a witness's confidence in his recall has been artificially enhanced
by hypnosis.").
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tude, with the subject unaware of any suggestions that he acted
upon or any confabulation in which he engaged. The subject's
firm belief in the veracity of his enhanced recollection is hon-
estly held, and cannot be undermined through cross-
examination. 163
Counsel's best efforts at cross-examination may not shake the witness'
version of the events described; the witness is testifying to what he or she
truly believes to be the truth, even though that description may be based
on the hypnotic session rather than firsthand knowledge.
1 64
After hypnosis, a witness is often able to report considerable detail
about the event in question and will most likely appear to be an ex-
tremely credible witness. In reality, hypnosis operates to obfuscate the
trier of fact, since "there may be no way to test his or her subjective belief
to ascertain the objective truth."' 165 Upon "awakening" from a hypnotic
trance, the subject can recall everything that was "remembered" during
163. Collins, 132 Ariz. at 189, 644 P.2d at 1274 (citing Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496
Pa. 97, 105, 436 A.2d 170, 174 (1981)). The subject's belief in the accuracy of his or her recall
provides the basis for the witness' increased confidence and unshakeable demeanor.
[T]he witness' conviction of the absolute truth of his hypnotically induced recollec-
tion grows stronger each time he is asked to repeat the story; by the time of trial, the
resulting 'memory' may be so fixed in his mind that traditional legal techniques such
as cross-examination may be largely ineffective to expose its unreliability.
People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 65, 723 P.2d 1354, 1383, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 272, cert. denied,
458 U.S. 1125, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982); see also State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 230,
624 P.2d 1274, 1278 (1981) (witness is likely to have greater confidence in hypnotically in-
duced memories than actual observations); Commonwealth v. Kanter, 388 Mass. 519, 528, 447
N.E.2d 1190, 1197 (1983) ("Subjects show increased confidence in the veracity of recollections
reported under hypnosis, regardless of their accuracy .... It is this ... tendency toward
immunization from meaningful cross-examination, that leads the defendant to argue that a
person, once hypnotized, should be forever barred as a witness to events discussed during
hypnosis."); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 769 (Minn. 1980) (impossible to meaningfully
cross-examine witness who is convinced of truth of those facts remembered only under hypno-
sis, thus possibly misleading jury); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 105, 436 A.2d
170, 174 (1981) ("The subject's firm belief in the veracity of his enhanced recollection is hon-
estly held, and cannot be undermined through cross-examination."); Diamond, supra note 12,
at 339 (hypnosis permits subject to resolve all doubts and uncertainties, giving witness confi-
dence in his or her recall and keeping from jury any indication of possible lack of certainty on
which they rely in determining weight of evidence in question).
164. Two commentators on the subject recognized this problem and noted:
[T]he oath or affirmation loses its meaning, for whilst the witness may be prepared to
tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth as he or she sees it, what the witness
honestly believes to be the truth could be a purely fictitious piece of information
planted in the mind of the witness during hypnosis.
Haward & Ashworth, supra note 36, at 476; see also THE FORENSIC USE OF HYPNOSIS, supra
note 4, at 2 (possible for well-intentioned witness to become "honest liar").
165. Collins, 132 Ariz. at 189, 644 P.2d at 1274; see also State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 540,
432 A.2d 86, 93-94 (1981); People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145, 160, 310 N.W.2d 306,
313-14 (1981), aff'd, 415 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982).
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the hypnotic session. 66 However, the subject may be unable to provide
an explanation as to how he or she was able to recall, but experiences a
"dawning awareness of the forgotten event."167 This enhanced recollec-
tion frustrates effective cross-examination on the basis of the witness' rec-
ollection, since the subject is unable to recall anything about the
influence of the hypnotic procedure itself. 1
68
A number of courts have concluded that simply because a witness'
confidence is strengthened by hypnosis does not itself result in a denial of
confrontation. 169 These courts have held that hypnosis does not render a
166. 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA Hypnosis 133, 137 (1974).
167. Id.
168. Peterson v. State, 448 N.E.2d 673 (Ind. 1983), provides an example of such a change in
memory. In Peterson, three men robbed a pharmacy during which one of the pharmacy em-
ployees was murdered. The defendant allegedly shot the pharmacist, put on a mask and left
the store with the stockboy, Gary Szeszycki. Szeszycki was released when the perpetrators
reached their car. Id. at 674. When the police were conducting their investigation, Szeszycki
was able to recount the details of the crime but could not identify the perpetrators. Id. Three
men, including the defendant, were later arrested, but Szeszycki was unable to pick the defend-
ant out of a photographic line-up. Three months after the crime, Szeszycki agreed to undergo
hypnosis. Id. After one session, Szeszycki was able to identify the defendant as the gunman,
as well as one other participant. Id. The defendant was found guilty of murder. Id. at 673.
The Supreme Court of Indiana reversed, noting that "Szeszycki was unable to give any factual
basis or explanation for his ability to identify Peterson after hypnosis when he was not able to
identify Peterson before hypnosis." Id. at 678. The court concluded that the identification
testimony was "inherently tainted," thereby denying the defendant's constitutional right to
confront and cross-examine. Id.
169. See, e.g., Chaussard v. Fulcomer, 816 F.2d 925, 930 (3d Cir. 1987) (court found no
denial of right to confrontation and cross-examination; counsel was able to cross-examine pre-
viously hypnotized witness as well as hypnotist); McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F.2d 951, 961-62
(4th Cir. 1987) (no denial of confrontation because witness testified independent of possible
dangers of hypnosis); Beck v. Norris, 801 F.2d 242, 245 (6th Cir. 1986) (use of hypnotic proce-
dure insufficient to constitute denial of defendant's right to fair trial; opportunity for cross-
examination provided adequate confrontation); Harker v. Maryland, 800 F.2d 437, 441-42
(4th Cir. 1986) (testimony of previously hypnotized witness did not violate defendant's right to
confrontation in any conventional sense; court noted that witness and prosecution's expert
were cross-examined, jury was aware that witness had been hypnotized and defense introduced
testimony of expert witness); Clay v. Vose, 771 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1212 (1986) (defendant was able to fully and extensively cross-examine witness and introduced
expert testimony to educate jury on possible effects of hypnosis); State v. Seager, 341 N.W.2d
420, 432 (Iowa 1983) (court considered admissibility of testimony in light of totality of truth
finding process, concluding that defendant must take his witnesses as he finds them for pur-
poses of cross-examination); People v. Nixon, 421 Mich. 79, 91-92, 364 N.W.2d 593, 599-600
(1984) (defendant was not denied fair trial because jury was aware that witness had been hyp-
notized; defense counsel was able to attack credibility of previously hypnotized witness); Hop-
kins v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 280, 292-93, 337 S.E.2d 264, 272 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 1498 (1986) (cross-examination of previously hypnotized witness and introduction of ex-
pert testimony sufficient to ensure criminal defendant right to confrontation); State v. Arm-
strong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 569, 329 N.W.2d 386, 393-94, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 946 (1983) (no
denial of confrontation because defendant was able to present evidence regarding witness'
prehypnosis recollection and expert testimony on effect of hypnosis on memory; court noted
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witness incapable of being effectively cross-examined. The Constitution
does not guarantee "perfect" cross-examination:
It may be true that a jury would be in a better position to
evaluate the truth of the prior statement if it could somehow be
whisked magically back in time to witness a gruelling cross-
examination of the declarant as he first gives his statement. But
the question as we see it must be not whether one can somehow
imagine the jury in "a better position," but whether subsequent
cross-examination at the defendant's trial will still afford the
trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the
prior statement.
170
A defendant may still question the witness fully, test the witness' version
for inconsistencies and bring out the possibility that the witness' de-
meanor is the product of hypnosis. 171 In addition, the defense may offer
the testimony of experts on the dangers of hypnosis. 72 The trier of fact
is then left to determine the credibility of the previously hypnotized
witness.
17 3
Courts holding that hypnosis does not render a witness incapable of
being cross-examined question whether the use of hypnosis operates to
tamper with the demeanor of a witness any more than other methods of
refreshing recollection 74 or preparing a witness for testimony at trial.
Any witness who has been "coached" by the prosecution prior to trial or
has had his or her memory refreshed by looking at a document can po-
tentially be subject to some alteration of demeanor. These methods, not
unlike simple reminders when one's memory has faded, are common
175
and do not result in the exclusion of evidence based on a denial of
confrontation. 
76
that other forms of refreshed recollection can increase witness' confidence); see also People v.
Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 546, 453 N.E.2d 484, 496, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255, 266-67 (1983) (court
recognized that increased confidence can effect defendant's right of cross-examination,
although degree of confidence gained may vary from individual to individual; trial court to
resolve this question at pretrial hearing since it may have little effect on defendant's power to
cross-examine).
170. Green, 399 U.S. at 160-61.
171. Clay, 771 F.2d at 4.
172. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2714.
173. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of credibility of the
previously hypnotized witness.
174. See FED. R. EvID. 612, 803 (5); CAL. EVID. CODE § 771, 1237 (West 1966).
175. MCCORMICK, supra note 31, at 17 ("The effect of a reminder, encountered in reading a
newspaper or in the conversation of a friend, which gives us the sensation of recognizing as
familiar some happening which we had forgotten, and prompts our memory to bring back
associated experiences, is a frequently encountered process.").
176. Cf People v. Williams, 132 Cal. App. 3d 920, 928, 183 Cal. Rptr. 498, 502 (1982)
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While the degree to which a previously hypnotized witness exper-
iences a greater confidence in his or her memory may vary, the possibility
that hypnosis may affect the witness in that respect calls for careful con-
sideration of a criminal defendant's constitutional challenge. Not every
previously hypnotized witness will experience an increased level of confi-
dence as a result of hypnosis-perhaps no more so than other methods of
refreshing recollection. However, the fact that hypnosis has been used
warrants a closer look; the use of hypnosis to refresh recollection brings
to issue the possible detrimental effects of suggestibility, confabulation
and overconfidence which do not arise with other court-approved proce-
dures for enhancing recall. Thus, while the use of hypnosis does not in
itself suggest a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights, the
unique dangers inherent in any hypnotic session call for careful evalua-
tion of the influence of hypnosis in each particular case to ensure the
criminal defendant the right to confront his or her accusers.
b. substantial change in testimony as a result of hypnosis-
hypnosis and hearsay
These potential confrontation problems are compounded when the
witness not only exhibits an unshakable demeanor, but also has had the
content of his or her recollections substantially changed by hypnosis. A
typical situation may involve a witness who remembered little or nothing
of the event in question prior to being hypnotized, but is suddenly able to
report substantial detail after hypnosis. In effect, two distinct witnesses
exist: one can remember very little about the event in question prior to
hypnosis and the other is able to remember a great deal after hypnosis.
The defendant is provided with an opportunity to cross-examine only the
witness now on the stand-the witness who is able to "remember."
Assume, for example, that the witness on the stand confidently testi-
fies in a manner inculpatory to the defendant. Prior to hypnosis, the
witness' memory may have suggested a neutral or exculpatory view of
the defendant's involvement. The witness who remembers inculpatory
evidence after hypnosis is a different witness than prior to hypnosis.
177
The confrontation clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right to
confront the witnesses against him. In hypnosis cases, however, the de-
(Gardner, J., concurring) ("[T]he idea that an eyeball witness... be denied the opportunity to
tell a jury his recollections of what he saw is disturbing to me whether that recollection has
been refreshed by hypnosis, truth serum, drugs, intimidation, coercion, brainwashing or im-
paired by the plain old passage of time.").
177. Comment, Hypnosis: A Survey of Its Legal Impact, 11 Sw. U.L. REV. 1421, 1445
(1979).
January 1988]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:635
fendant is unable to confront that witness at the time when he or she
became the witness against him, that is, under hypnosis. The defendant
is able to confront only the witness who is now on the stand. The defend-
ant arguably cannot effectively cross-examine on the basis of the witness'
recollection of the inculpatory evidence.' 78 Thus, there may be no way
to ascertain the accuracy of the witness' beliefs because he or she may be
unable to provide a basis for the substantial change in memory.
One method to counter the testimony of a witness who has exper-
ienced increased memory due to hypnosis is to interpose an objection on
the grounds of hearsay. Although the declarant is on the stand at trial,
the statements made out-of-court while under hypnosis, submitted to
prove the truth of the matter asserted at trial, fall within the definition of
hearsay.' 79 Additionally, several layers of hearsay may exist. If the wit-
ness remembers inculpatory evidence only after the hypnosis and is un-
able to account for the increased memory, that witness is merely
repeating the out-of-court statements uttered while under hypnosis-the
first level of hearsay. Only at that time, while under hypnosis, did the
witness become the witness against the accused. Further, due to the po-
tential influence of suggestion inherent in the hypnotic session, the hyp-
notized subject may be repeating "accusations" which are, in reality, the
implanted suggestions of the hypnotist-the second level of hearsay.
Thus, the inculpatory statements against the accused may not be the per-
ceptions of the witness, but rather the hearsay statements of the agency
conducting the hypnotic session. 180
In State v. Contreras, 8' the Alaska Court of Appeals analogized the
use of hypnotically enhanced testimony to the introduction of hearsay. 182
178. See supra notes 154-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of confrontation of the
previously hypnotized witness.
179. See FED. R. EvID. 801(c), which defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted." Id.
180. This danger of hearsay may not be cured if the witness' testimony is restricted to
prehypnotic memory. When the witness' memory of the event has changed after hypnosis,
those "new" recollections are accepted by the witness as the true perceptions of the event in
question. If the testimony is limited to prehypnotic recollections, the witness is not actually
testifying to his or her present memory of the event in question. Rather, the witness is merely
repeating those statements made prior to hypnosis that allegedly reflect prehypnotic mem-
ory-the very essence of an out-of-court statement being admitted against an accused. Thus,
the danger exists that even this theory of inadmissibility allows the introduction of hearsay
against an accused.
181. 674 P.2d 792, 819 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 718 P.2d 129 (Alaska 1986).
182. See also McQueen v. Garrison, 617 F. Supp. 633, 637 (D.N.C. 1985), rev'd, 814 F.2d
951 (4th Cir. 1987) (hypnosis analysis parallels that which the United States Supreme Court
has applied to hearsay); Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 33, 723 P.2d at 1362, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 251
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In Contreras, two witnesses were able to identify their assailants only
after undergoing hypnosis.1 83 In deciding whether the hypnotically in-
duced testimony was admissible, the Contreras court used the test estab-
lished by the United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts
184
regarding the admission of hearsay against a criminal defendant without
violating the confrontation clause. The Roberts Court held that before
hearsay may be admitted the proponent must show: (1) that the declar-
ant is unavailable and (2) that the hearsay possesses adequate indicia of
reliability. If the hearsay does not fall within a "firmly rooted" hearsay
exception, it must be excluded unless a showing of "particularized guar-
antees of trustworthiness is made."' 85
The Contreras court concluded that the previously hypnotized wit-
nesses were effectively "unavailable on the issue of identification only to
the extent that their demeanor might have been affected by the hypnotic
sessions."186 With respect to the second tier of the Roberts test, the court
found that the witnesses' in-court identification-the "conceptual
equivalent of hearsay"-bore sufficient indicia of reliability to be admit-
ted in light of other inculpatory evidence against the defendants.
87
The Alaska Supreme Court reversed, holding that the admission of
the witnesses' hypnotically enhanced identification testimony denied the
defendants' their constitutional right to confront witnesses. 88 The
supreme court took the court of appeals' analogy one step further by
adopting an interpretation of Roberts to apply to hypnosis cases. Roberts
requires that the prosecution demonstrate a good faith effort to procure
the witness at trial before the witness is considered unavailable.' 89 Ap-
plying this standard, the Contreras court found the witnesses to be "un-
available" since "[t]he police ... arguably failed to make duly diligent,
good faith efforts to exhaust other investigative leads before resorting to
hypnosis."' 90 Further, the opinion disapproved of the court of appeals'
finding that the "hearsay" statements bore adequate indicia of reliability
because of the weight of other evidence against the defendants. The
supreme court noted that "[f]ocusing on corroboration leads to boot-
("statements made under hypnosis may not be introduced to prove the truth of the matter
asserted because the reliability of such statements is questionable") (emphasis omitted).
183. Id. at 794, 797-99.
184. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980).
185. Id. at 66.
186. Contreras, 674 P.2d at 819.
187. Id.
188. Contreras, 718 P.2d 129, 139 (Alaska 1986).
189. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74 (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719. 724-25 (1968)).
190. Contreras, 718 P.2d at 139.
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strapping unreliable testimony. The notion that witnesses can be made
'unavailable' through hypnosis and then have their statements made reli-
able through corroboration is troublesome."' 9 ' Given the potential dan-
gers of hypnosis, particularly the possible tampering with a witness'
demeanor, the court concluded that the admission of the hypnotically
refreshed testimony deprives defendants of their constitutional right of
confrontation of witnesses. 1
92
For hypnosis to meet the two-prong test of Ohio v. Roberts,19 a
creative interpretation of the requirement of unavailability is required. A
witness who has been hypnotized does not fit into any traditional defini-
tion of unavailability simply by virtue of the hypnosis.' 94 The Alaska
Court of Appeals and the Alaska Supreme Court offered their interpreta-
tions of the unavailability requirement so that hypnosis could be com-
pared to hearsay.' 95 Since Roberts, however, the United States Supreme
Court has stated that the unavailability prong must be met only when
seeking to introduce former testimony. 96 Thus, when applied to hypno-
sis testimony, all that remains of the Roberts test is that the "hearsay"
bear adequate indicia of reliability for its admission to comply with the
confrontation clause.
Under this hearsay/hypnosis analogy, the standard set by the
United States Supreme Court for analyzing the trustworthiness of out-of-
court statements must be considered to determine whether hypnosis is
sufficiently reliable to comply with the confrontation clause. In Dutton v.
Evans, 9 7 the Court provided four factors to be evaluated when determin-
ing whether hearsay possesses sufficient "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness." Hearsay has a greater likelihood of being trustworthy
when: (1) the out-of-court statement does not contain an express asser-
tion about a past fact; (2) the possibility that the out-of-court statement is
founded on faulty recollection is extremely remote; (3) the circumstances
under which the statement was made indicate that the declarant is not
misrepresenting the facts; and (4) the declarant had personal knowledge
of the matters asserted in the statement.
98
Comparing "hearsay" statements uttered by a subject while under
191. Id.; see also id. at 138 ("We are not convinced that corroboration is a panacea, even if
strict procedural safeguards are observed concerning the hypnotic session.").
192. Id. at 139.
193. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
194. See FED. R. EvID. 804(a) for the definition of unavailability.
195. Contreras, 674 P.2d at 819; Contreras, 718 P.2d at 139.
196. United States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121, 1125-26 (1986).
197. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
198. Id. at 88-89.
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hypnosis with the four Dutton factors, the declarations arguably fail to
assure sufficient trustworthiness to be admissible against an accused. In
terms of the first Dutton factor, the statements clearly contain a narration
about a past fact; the witness is hypnotized so that he or she may recall a
prior event. The second Dutton factor-that the possibility of faulty rec-
ollection is extremely remote-is troublesome when considered in the
context of hypnosis. The witness was initially hypnotized because of an
inability to fully remember what happened. Simply because a witness
was hypnotized does not assure that the defects in the witness' recollec-
tion are cured, since hypnosis is not yet proven as an accurate method of
refreshing recollection.' 99 The dangers of suggestibility and confabula-
tion are such that a possibility exists that the "facts" the witness is able to
"remember" under hypnosis are not a true reflection of the events as they
took place.2" With respect to the third Dutton factor-the possible mis-
representation of facts-the dangers of suggestibility and confabulation
again come into play. Hypnosis does not assure that the witness is relay-
ing only accurate data, or that the witness is not intentionally lying. Fi-
nally, the possibility that the hypnotized witness is not speaking from
personal knowledge eliminates the fourth Dutton factor. When the wit-
ness is able to "recall" only after undergoing hypnosis, particularly when
he or she cannot provide a factual basis for the statements, a danger sur-
faces that the witness lacks firsthand knowledge.2°'
While hypnosis does not negatively influence the recollection of the
hypnotized subject in every case, the severity of the consequences is sub-
stantial enough for courts to entertain an objection based on hearsay.
The admission of such out-of-court statements may preclude the defend-
ant from confronting his or her accuser if that witness is only able to
repeat what was remembered under hypnosis. Although the witness may
swear that the testimony is based upon personal knowledge, it may un-
knowingly be based upon inadmissible out-of-court statements.202 The
party raising the objection should bear the burden of establishing that the
testimony is actually hearsay. If the statements do not meet the four
factors articulated in Dutton, then the court should conclude that the
statements are not sufficiently trustworthy to permit their admission
against an accused and exclude them on the basis of inadmissible hear-
say. The proponent of the evidence may overcome the objection by dem-
199. See supra note 5.
200. See supra notes 13-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dangers of sug-
gestibility and confabulation.
201. See supra notes 126-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of personal knowledge.
202. See supra note 164.
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onstrating that the "hearsay" is sufficiently reliable under the Dutton
factors, possibly through corroborating the witness' testimony or
through the introduction of independent evidence against the accused.
An objection based on hearsay may provide the accused with an alterna-
tive method of challenging the prosecution's case, thereby preserving the
defendant's constitutional right to confrontation of witnesses.
2. A criminal defendant's right to due process of law
In addition to the problems of confrontation and cross-examination,
the use of hypnosis may potentially deny the criminal defendant the right
to due process of law. The use of hypnosis by the prosecution must be
kept in careful check, lest its use as an investigative technique impede the
defendant's right to a fair trial. Due process violations may occur in two
situations: (1) when the prosecution invents previously non-existent in-
culpatory evidence, such as when the use of hypnosis taints an eyewit-
ness' identification of the accused or (2) when the prosecution destroys
previously existing exculpatory evidence, such as when the prosecution
abuses the use of hypnosis as a forensic tool. Although not always ex-
plicitly decided on due process grounds, these cases in effect stand for the
proposition that the abuse and misuse of hypnosis can present a barrier
to the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.2" 3
a. eyewitness identification and hypnosis
Contrary to popular notions, eyewitness identifications are often an
unreliable method of building the prosecution's case against an ac-
cused.2 ° 4 Relying on a witness' identification of another person is often
questionable,0 5 particularly when the witness was involved in or viewed
an intense experience such as the commission of a crime. "[E]xcitement
exaggerates, sometimes grossly, distortion in perception and memory es-
203. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
204. See generally Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testinony on
the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REv. 969 (1977).
205. Stewart, Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law and The Pro-
posed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REv. 1, 15 (1970) ("Perception of height,
weight, age, and personal identification are especially vulnerable to inaccuracy."). As one
commentator noted:
It is a Kafkaesque world in which people testify to what they could neither see nor
hear accurately, nor recall nor communicate fully, in which victory becomes an end
in itself, and in which men and women compromise to reach a decision that they base
upon partially understood testimony, partisan arguments, and abstract judicial
charges. Life and liberty, property and reputation, are staked on bets or guesses as to
what really happened.
Marshall, Evidence, Psychology, and the Trial. Some Challenges to Law, 63 Colum. L. Rev.
197, 231 (1963).
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pecially when the observer is a witness to a nonroutine episodic event
.... The likelihood of inaccurate perception, the drawing of inferences
to fill in memory gaps, and the reporting of nonfacts is high."2 °6 When
the witness makes an identification which will be used as the basis for a
criminal prosecution, the danger of inaccuracies translates into the po-
tential violation of the constitutional right to due process of law.
"[R]eliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of iden-
tification testimony . *."..,o" In Neil v. Biggers2 °8 and Manson v.
Brathwaite,09 the United States Supreme Court considered the issue of
the reliability of in-court testimony when the basis of that testimony is
the witness' prior out-of-court identification of the defendant. In an ef-
fort to guard against suggestive identification procedures, the Court held
that a defendant's due process rights are violated if a substantial likeli-
hood of misidentification exists based on the suggestive identification
procedure through which the witness was able to identify the defend-
ant.21 The Court further noted that even if the identification procedure
was suggestive, the "totality of the circumstances" are to be evaluated to
determine whether the identification was nevertheless reliable.21' The
suggestive confrontation must be weighed against five factors: (1) the
opportunity of the witness to view the criminal; (2) the witness' degree of
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of the witness' prior description;
(4) the witness' level of certainty at the time of the out-of-court identifica-
tion; and (5) the length of time between the event in question and the
identification procedure.2 12 If the confrontation is found to be unduly
suggestive and the surrounding circumstances reveal that the witness
would not have been able to make an identification without that sugges-
tiveness, then the witness' identification must be excluded.
206. Stewart, supra note 205, at 28. Professor Stewart commented:
Memory of a poorly defined perceptual matter is especially susceptible to substantial
alteration by attitudes which shape the image of the event and conform it to precon-
ceptions construed from the associated affect. Such memories are very unfaithful to
their originals. Recall of faces is particularly subject to the distortive influence of
affective attitudes since people often initially respond to others in an emotional way.
Long after the visual image decays, the affect endures. A description of a face may
be constructed in part from a stereotype associated with the observer's emotional
response to the face or from a conventional personality type associated with the face
in question.
Id. at 17.
207. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977); see also Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188,
198 (1972); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
208. Neil, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
209. Manson, 432 U.S. 98 (1976).
210. Neil, 409 U.S. at 198; Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
211. 409 U.S. at 199.
212. Id.; see also Manson, 432 U.S. at 114-15.
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These problems of eyewitness identifications may be exacerbated
when hypnosis plays a role in the witness' ability to identify the crimi-
nal.213 In the urgency of the investigation to find a suspect or careless
use of overly suggestive tactics, law enforcement officials may influence
the witness' description through the hypnotic procedure to such an ex-
tent that the reliability of the witness' subsequent in-court testimony may
be irreparably tainted. Studies reveal that the use of hypnosis for pur-
poses of refreshing the recollection of an eyewitness does not lead to ac-
curate identifications, and in fact increases the likelihood of incorrect
identifications being credited as positive memories.214 Hypnotized sub-
jects are more easily influenced by leading questions than their
nonhypnotized counterparts and express a higher degree of confidence in
the accuracy of their responses, even though erroneous.2 15 An eyewit-
ness or victim who has a substantial interest in providing law enforce-
ment officials with a description of the criminal may be even more
susceptible to the dangers inherent in being questioned while under hyp-
nosis. The influence of suggestibility and confabulation compounding
otherwise suggestive procedures may render the witness' identification so
unreliable as to potentially violate the defendant's right to due process of
law.216
A totality of the circumstances approach, as used in Nell 217 and
Manson,2 18 may not accurately reflect the untrustworthiness of the iden-
tification made under hypnosis. The witness' opportunity to view the
criminal and the degree of attention at the time generally increase the
likelihood of an accurate identification. The probative value of these fac-
tors, however, is decreased when the witness had to be hypnotized before
being able to provide a sufficiently detailed description. The witness'
level of certainty in his or her description is misleading when that de-
scription is made under hypnosis. As mentioned above, hypnotized sub-
jects credit even erroneous "memories" as accurate. Further com-
plications are presented by the danger of overconfidence inherent in any
213. See supra notes 15 & 168 for a discussion of State v. Joblin, 107 Idaho 351, 689 P.2d
767 (1984) and Peterson v. State, 448 N.E.2d 673 (Ind. 1983) and the influence of hypnosis on
eyewitness identification.
214. Wagstafl, Hypnosis and Recognition of a Face, 55 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 816,
817-18 (1982); see also Putnam, supra note 14, at 444 ("There is every reason to believe that
the tendency to distort recall would be even greater in a real criminal investigation, where the
witness may have a vested interest in recalling the information.").
215. Putnam, supra note 14, at 444.
216. Cf. Harker, 800 F.2d at 442 ("Suggestibility and memory hardening are not unique to
hypnosis; they are potential problems whenever an eyewitness makes an identification.").
217. Neil, 409 U.S. at 199-200.
218. Manson, 432 U.S. at 114-16.
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hypnotic session. a 9 A relatively short lapse of time lapse between the
crime and the identification is not an absolute safeguard against the dan-
gers of distortions in memory that may occur to the hypnotized subject.
Thus, when an eyewitness is able to provide a description only after hyp-
nosis, the dangers of the hypnotic session are so influential that a sub-
stantial likelihood of misidentification exists.
The potential for tainting an identification through the misuse of
hypnosis is illustrated in State v. Hurd.aa0 In Hurd, the victim was re-
peatedly stabbed as she lay asleep in the bedroom of her apartment which
she shared with her husband and children."2 Although unable to de-
scribe her assailant, the victim asked the police to "check out" her for-
mer husband, the defendant. Shortly thereafter, two officers from the
prosecutor's office arranged for the victim to undergo hypnosis to en-
hance her recollection of the incident. While under hypnosis, the victim
was told to respond to questions from both the hypnotist and the officers
who were present,222 who asked such leading questions as "Is it Paul?",
referring to the defendant. Further, when the victim expressed mistrust
about her identification of the defendant made under hypnosis, the hyp-
notist and officers encouraged her to accept the identification, even
though no evidence corroborating the identification existed.2 2 3 They sug-
gested that if she did not accept her identification, she would be indi-
rectly implicating her present husband, who remained a suspect, and that
the defendant was free to attack her again.224 Based on these facts, the
court found that the hypnotic session was highly suggestive and excluded
the victim's identification.225
Since the prosecution did not meet its burden of establishing the
reliability of hypnosis, the court did not explicitly reach the defendant's
due process argument.226 However, the facts of Hurd illustrate how hyp-
219. See supra notes 31-37 & 159-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of overconfi-
dence in hypnotized individuals and its impact on the defendant's right to confrontation of
witnesses.
220. 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
221. Id. at 529, 432 A.2d at 88.
222. Id. at 531, 432 A.2d at 88.
223. Id. at 531, 432 A.2d at 89.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 549, 432 A.2d at 98.
226. Id. See text accompanying supra notes 112-21 for a discussion of Little v. Armontrout,
819 F.2d 1425 (8th Cir. 1987), where the court found the witness' identification constitution-
ally unreliable, thereby violating the defendant's right to due process of law. For other cases
considering the reliability of a previously hypnotized witness' identification testimony, see
Harker, 800 F.2d at 443; United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1203 (5th Cir. 1984); People
v. Cohoon, 104 I11. 2d 295, 300-01, 472 N.E.2d 403, 406 (1984); Harmon v. State, 700 P.2d
212, 217-18 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985) (Bussey, J., dissenting); Vester v. State, 713 S.W.2d 920,
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nosis can taint an identification, with respect to both the ability of the
witness to make an identification under hypnosis and the overly sugges-
tive tactics used during the hypnotic session itself. Identifications made
while the witness is under hypnosis must be viewed with suspicion, par-
ticularly when the law enforcement agency is an active participant in
questioning the witness. The use of hypnosis for purposes of eyewitness
identification may result in misidentification and thus deny the defendant
the right to due process of law.
b. the good faith use of hypnosis as a forensic tool
A criminal defendant may raise a due process argument based on
the abuse of hypnosis when the prosecution does not use the technique in
good faith, resulting in the destruction of exclupatory evidence. Hypno-
sis is not yet universally accepted as a reliable means of refreshing recol-
lection. Yet, it can be viewed as an attractive procedure to the pros-
ecution and law enforcement officials if it has the possibility of building a
case against a criminal defendant. Although hypnosis is arguably accept-
able when the investigation is lacking any direct evidence,227 its use is less
justified when sufficient evidence is already available and the technique is
used merely as a means of confirming the suspicions of the police.228
In State v. Long,229 the abuse of hypnosis by the prosecution re-
sulted in the dismissal of the case against the defendant. The defendant
in Long was charged with first degree assault. In support of the defense,
two eyewitnesses submitted written statements to the effect that Long
had acted in self-defense. 23 0 On the eve of trial, two months after the
investigation had been completed, the prosecution arranged for the hyp-
nosis of one of the defense witnesses.2 3' In the hypnotic session, this
witness was able to recall that the victim did not have a weapon and had
not attacked the defendant. This crippled Long's defense because the
other eyewitness was looking elsewhere at the crucial moment of the inci-
dent. 32 The defendant was convicted.233
On appeal, the case against the defendant was dismissed. The court
923-24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 571-80, 329 N.W.2d 386,
394-98, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 946 (1983).
227. See supra note 7.
228. People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 544-45, 453 N.E.2d 484, 495, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255, 266
(1983).
229. 32 Wash. App. 732, 649 P.2d 845 (1982).
230. Id. at 733, 649 P.2d at 845.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 734, 649 P.2d at 845.
233. Id. at 733, 649 P.2d at 845.
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held that the prosecution's hypnosis of the defense witness, and the resul-
tant change in memory, prevented the defendant from having an oppor-
tunity to interview his material witness without the taint of hypnosis,
rendering that witness incapable of being rehabilitated.234 In so holding,
the majority in Long noted:
That hypnosis is a valuable and important investigative proce-
dure in police work has been established. Properly handled it
can do much good without the harm of contaminating the mind
of the person interviewed. But there must be care taken in the
employment of the technique and there must be good cause. In
this case there was neither .... The purpose could only have
been to change the story of the key witness[] from what she
had said in a statement written shortly after the event.235
Prosecutors and law enforcement officials must be deterred from using
hypnosis on potential witnesses in less than good faith. Otherwise, the
misuse of this forensic tool may result in the denial of a defendant's right
to a fair trial.236
234. Id. at 738, 649 P.2d at 847 (citing State v. Dailey, 93 Wash. 2d 454, 610 P.2d 357
(1980)).
235. 32 Wash. App. at 737, 649 P.2d at 847.
236. Such conduct may also be violative of the defendant's right to due process of law oil
the grounds that it "shocks the conscience" of the court. In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952), the United States Supreme Court held that a conviction will not be permitted to stand
if the methods employed offended "a sense of justice." Id. at 173. In Rochlt, three officers
illegally entered the home of the defendant, who was suspected of selling narcotics. Upon the
officers' entry into his bedroom, the defendant swallowed two capsules of morphine. Id. at
166. The defendant was taken to the hospital where, at the request of one of the officers, he
was given an emetic solution, causing the defendant to vomit. Id. The two capsules were
found to contain morphine and the defendant was convicted on that basis. Id. The court of
appeal affirmed Rochin's conviction and the California Supreme Court denied review. Id. at
166-67. In reversing the conviction, id. at 174, the United States Supreme Court concluded
that the "proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than offend some fas-
tidous squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too energetically.
This is conduct that shocks the conscience." Id. at 172.
The Rochin standard is most often applied when the conduct in question rises to the level
of a constitutional violation of the defendant's rights. The standard may also, however, be
used when the methods employed do not violate constitutional rights. "In such cases. Rochiin
may well mean that evidence must be excluded if it was obtained in a manner that offends
important values that are not embodied in specific constitutional doctrines, at least if the af-
front to those values was an extreme or outrageous one." MCCORMICK, supra note 31. at 498.
Conceivably, hypnosis could be abused to such an extent that it may "shock the con-
science" under the Rochin standard. Law enforcement officials may abuse the technique of
hypnosis, resulting in conduct which is offensive or lacks good faith. See, e.g., Long. 32 Wash.
App. 732, 649 P.2d 845, discussed supra text accompanying notes 229-35. The courts should
not tolerate offensive conduct in hypnosis cases since it effectively denies the defendant the
right to a fair trial. All evidence obtained in such a manner must be excluded and the constitu-
tional rights of criminal defendants preserved.
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Since the dangers of hypnosis are particularly significant when the
subject is hypnotized in anticipation of testifying at a criminal proceed-
ing, the technique must be used sparingly and in good faith. Law en-
forcement agencies should resort to the use of hypnosis only when all
other methods of obtaining evidence are exhausted. The use of hypnosis
is justified only when the evidence clearly indicates that the witness to be
hypnotized had an opportunity to observe the incident, but is merely ex-
periencing a lapse of memory. Further, the limitations of hypnosis must
be recognized; while hypnosis may be effective in assisting a witness' re-
call, the witness should not provide more information than he or she was
capable of perceiving or remembering. The realities of the hypnotic ses-
sion warrant careful evaluation of the reliability of the witness' "mem-
ory," particularly when admitted against an accused in a criminal
trial.237
237. Although potentially unreliable evidence is at times admitted against an accused, not
every case will demand a retrial. "If it is sufficiently clear that another trial conducted without
committing a particular error would lead to the same result, using judicial resources to con-
duct that retrial is obviously inefficient." MCCORMICK, supra note 31, at 533. This rule is
embodied in the harmless error standard established by the United States Supreme Court in
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, reh'g denied, 386 U.S. 987 (1967). In Chapman, the
Court held that federal constitutional error is harmless if the beneficiary of the error is able to
prove to the court beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the jury
verdict or conviction. Id. at 24.
The harmless error rule is most often applied in cases involving a violation of the exclu-
sionary rule, but the standard has also been applied to hypnosis cases in which testimony of a
previously hypnotized witness has been admitted and the defendant convicted. Depending on
the facts of the case, a number of courts have found the introduction of hypnotically refreshed
testimony to be harmless error. See, e.g., King v. State, 460 N.E.2d 947, 950 (Ind. 1984)
(admission of previously hypnotized witness' testimony held to be harmless error because of
cumulative nature of testimony); State v. Blanchard, 315 N.W.2d 427, 431 (Minn. 1982) (not
reversible error to admit witness' hypnotically induced recollection; although witness was able
to provide more details under hypnosis, prehypnosis memory contained damaging evidence
against accused which remained unchanged after hypnosis); State v. Payne, 312 N.C. 647, 659,
325 S.E.2d 205, 213 (1985) (no reasonable possibility that jury would have reached different
verdict had testimony of previously hypnotized witness been excluded). Other courts have
found that the error involved was indeed harmful, requiring reversal of the defendant's convic-
tion. See, e.g., Little, 819 F.2d at 1435 (court found error was not harmless; victim's tainted
identification testimony was only positive testimony placing defendant at scene, testimony was
largely uncorroborated, fingerprints from scene did not match defendant's and victim's initial
description of her assailant did not fit defendant); People v. Guerra, 37 Cal. 3d 385, 429, 690
P.2d 635, 665, 208 Cal. Rptr. 162, 191 (1984) (prejudicial error for trial court to admit testi-
mony of rape victim who recalled act of penetration only after hypnosis and whose testimony
was virtually sole incriminating evidence against defendants).
Reliance on an appellate court's decision that the introduction of hypnotically enhanced
testimony was harmful to the defendant is no substitute for a uniform rule of inadmissibility.
On the other hand, the use of hypnosis in a criminal proceeding does not always affect a
substantial right of the defendant and judicial resources should not be consumed on those cases
in which the harm was negligible. Not all evidence introduced through a previously hypno-
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B. The Use of Hypnosis by the Criminal Defendant
Just as the prosecution has resorted to the use of hypnosis in gather-
ing evidence against the accused, so have criminal defendants sought the
use of hypnosis in preparing their defense. When the criminal defendant
seeks to introduce hypnotically refreshed testimony in his or her case,
new issues enter the equation. Certainly, if a criminal defendant were to
misuse hypnosis as a forensic tool, the evidence or testimony obtained
thereby should be excluded. However, when the defense properly uses
hypnosis, certain rights uniquely available to criminal defendants must
be recognized and weighed in determining the admissibility of hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony.
The United States Constitution reserves certain rights to criminal
defendants to provide them with an adequate opportunity to defend the
case against them.238 The United States Supreme Court has stated that
every criminal defendant must have "a reasonable opportunity to meet
[the charges against him] by way of defense or explanation, have the
right to be represented by counsel, and have a chance to testify and call
other witnesses in his behalf, either by way of defense or explanation.
' 239
These constitutional guarantees apply both when the defendant presents
witnesses on his or her behalf240 and when the defendant chooses to tes-
tify.24' No preexisting state rule of evidence or per se exclusion of ques-
tized witness is crucial to the trier of fact's determination of guilt. Until the constitutionality
of the use of hypnosis testimony is decided, the harmless error rule will serve to at least correct
those wrongs committed at the trial level and perhaps help to establish guidelines for the
constitutional admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony in the future.
238. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV (right against unreasonable searches and seizures); U.S.
CONsT. amend. V (right to grand jury indictment for capital cases, right against double jeop-
ardy, right against self-incrimination, right to due process of law); U.S. CONST. amend. VI
(right to speedy trial, right to public trial, right to fair and impartial trial, right to jury trial,
right to information regarding the charges against accused, right to confrontation of witnesses,
right to compulsory process, right to assistance of counsel).
239. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275 (1948).
240. The sixth amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to obtain witnesses in
their favor. U.S. CONtST. amend. VI. This right of compulsory process is the companion to the
constitutional right to confrontation of witnesses. Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73
MICH. L. REv. 71, 73 (1974) [hereinafter Westen I]. For a discussion of this constitutional
provision which provides the defendant with affirmative aid in presenting his or her defense,
see generally, Westen I, supra; Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified The-
ory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REv. 567 (1978); Westen, Compulsory Process
II, 74 MICH. L. REV. 191 (1975).
241. The state cannot completely restrict a criminal defendant's due process right to testify
in his or her own defense. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988, 993, 1004-05 n.5 (1986). This
right does not, however, permit the defendant to testify in whatever manner he or she pleases.
See id. at 998; Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971). "'Indeed, the due process deci-
sions relied on by the Court all envision that an individual's right to present evidence on his
behalf is not absolute and must often times give way to countervailing considerations.'" Rock
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tionable evidence may prevent the accused from responding to the state's
case. The exclusion of defense evidence is tantamount to a violation of
the defendant's constitutional right to due process of law.242
These constitutional guarantees may outweigh the potentially con-
taminating influence of hypnosis. As seen above, the taint of hypnosis
has often justified the exclusion of testimony presented by the prosecu-
tion. Given the constitutional implications, however, the admissibility of
posthypnosis testimony from a prosecution witness differs substantially
from the defense use of hypnosis. The questionable reliability of hypno-
sis is no longer the sole issue. In addition, the court must consider the
defendant's fundamental rights, rooted in the Constitution.
1. The impact of Rock v. Arkansas
243
To date, state and federal courts have developed their own theories
concerning the admissibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony without
the imposition of any constitutional restrictions. The United States
Supreme Court in Rock v. Arkansas244 recently broke its silence on the
issue of hypnosis and recognized the unique considerations involved in
the use of hypnosis by a criminal defendant. Reserving for a later time
the resolution of the issue of hypnosis as an investigative tool, a closely
divided Court found the constitutional rights of the accused paramount
in spite of the potential unreliability of hypnotically refreshed
testimony.
245
a. the facts
At issue in Rock was the constitutionality of a state's per se exclu-
sion of hypnotically refreshed testimony of a criminal defendant who,
due to a previous lapse in memory, was able to establish her defense only
under hypnosis. 246 The defendant was charged with manslaughter for
the shooting death of her husband. 247 The defendant and her husband
had an argument over their living arrangement and Mr. Rock's insis-
tence that the defendant not leave their home to get something to eat.248
v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2716 (1987) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970); In re Oli-
ver, 333 U.S. 257, 273, 275 (1948)).
242. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
243. 107 S. Ct. 2704.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 2714-15.
246. Id. at 2706-07.
247. Id. at 2706.
248. Id.
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This dispute ended in Mr. Rock's death by a gunshot wound.2 4 9 The
defendant recalled that she was physically abused by her husband when
she attempted to leave that evening and that she had a gun in her hand,
but was unable to remember important details of the shooting.25 °
Mrs. Rock's attorney hired a licensed neuropsychologist for pur-
poses of enhancing the defendant's recollection through hypnosis.25 ' She
submitted to two hypnotic sessions which did not reveal any new infor-
mation. Afterwards, however, the defendant was able to recall that she
did not have her finger on the trigger of the gun and that the gun had
discharged accidentally when her husband struggled with her.252 As a
result of this information, defense counsel ordered an examination of the
weapon, which revealed the gun to be defective and prone to firing with-
out the trigger being pulled.2 3 The trial court ruled that the defendant's
hypnotically refreshed statements were inadmissible due to the unrelia-
bility of hypnosis, but permitted her to testify to subjects remembered
prior to undergoing hypnosis.254 The Supreme Court of Arkansas
affirmed.255
b. the majority opinion
In a five to four vote, the United States Supreme Court vacated the
judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court, holding that the state's exclu-
sion of the defendant's testimony "infringes impermissibly on the right of
a defendant to testify on his or her own behalf., 25 6 The majority opinion
by Justice Blackmun found the defendant's claim to be "bottomed on her
constitutional right to testify in her own defense." '257 The Court noted
that the right to testify is embedded in the criminal defendant's right to
249. Id.
250. Id. The defendant was distraught when the police arrived on the scene and was ulti-
mately removed from the investigation area due to her attempts to telephone the victim's
parents.
251. The hypnotist was trained in the use of hypnosis. Id. The defense attorney failed to
inform the court or the prosecutor that the defendant was to undergo hypnosis. Rock v. State,
288 Ark. 566, 568, 708 S.W.2d 78, 79 (1986), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987).
252. 107 S. Ct. at 2707. Both hypnotic sessions were recorded on tape and the hypnotist
had handwritten notes of the substance of the defendant's statements. Id. at 2706-07 & n.2.
253. Id. at 2707.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 2707-08.
256. Id. at 2714-15.
257. Id. at 2708. The common law rule rendering a defendant incompetent to testify has
long since given way to a rule of competency. See generally Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570
(1961) (tracing history of competency of criminal defendant to testify). See also supra notes
79-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the competency of the previously hypnotized
witness.
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due process of law, 258 the sixth amendment right to call witnesses in his
or her favor,2 59 as well as the fifth amendment guarantee against self-
incrimination . 6  The Court found the right of the accused to testify fun-
damental to a personal defense, noting that "[a] defendant's opportunity
to conduct his own defense by calling witnesses is incomplete if he may
not present himself as a witness.",2 6' The Court further noted:
[T]he most important witness for the defense in many criminal
cases is the defendant himself. There is no justification today
for a rule that denies an accused the opportunity to offer his
own testimony. Like the truthfulness of other witnesses, the
defendant's veracity, which was the concern behind the original
common-law rule, can be tested adequately by cross-
examination. 62
Regarding Arkansas' per se exclusion of posthypnotic testimony,
the Court held that such a rule arbitrarily excluded the defendant's testi-
mony, and that the interests of the state did not warrant limiting the
constitutional rights of the accused.2 63 The Court relied upon their ear-
lier decisions in Washington v. Texas 2 "' and Chambers v. Mississippi26 1 to
258. 107 S. Ct. at 2709 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)). Faretta empha-
sized the right of self-representation as essential to the defense of the criminally accused. 422
U.S. at 819.
259. 107 S. Ct. at 2709 (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)).
260. Id. at 2710 (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 230 (1971)). "Every criminal
defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so." Harris, 401 U.S. at
230.
261. 107 S. Ct. at 2710.
262. Id. at 2709. See generally Westen I, supra note 240, at 119-20.
263. 107 S. Ct. at 2711-12.
264. 388 U.S. 14 (1967). The defendant in Washington was convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to 50 years in prison. As part of his defense, the defendant sought to introduce the
exculpatory testimony of a coparticipant in the crime, who had in fact been convicted and
sentenced for the same murder for which the defendant was held. Id. at 16. The prosecution
successfully barred the introduction of the testimony, relying on two Texas statutes which
prevented coparticipants in the same crime from testifying for one another, although no such
rule prevented the prosecution from using such testimony. Id. at 16-17. The Court held that
the defendant's sixth amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his or
her favor was a "fundamental element of due process of law." Id. at 19. Thus, the Court
found the state had "arbitrarily denied him the right to put on the stand a witness who was
physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had personally observed, and
whose testimony would have been relevant and material to the defense." Id. at 23.
265. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). In Chambers, the defendant was charged with killing a police
officer, but asserted that the crime was committed by one Gable McDonald. Id. at 289. The
defense called McDonald as its own witness and submitted his sworn written confession into
evidence. Id. at 291. On cross-examination, McDonald repudiated his confession, noting his
earlier claims of innocence. Id. On redirect, the defense attempted to submit unsworn self-
incriminatory statements allegedly made by McDonald to three witnesses. The trial court
blocked the introduction of the evidence on the basis that the statements were hearsay and
HYPNOSIS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
prohibit the state from interfering with the defendant's right to testify.2 66
Favoring the admissibility of relevant testimony, the United States
Supreme Court has held that a state may not arbitrarily preclude a de-
fense witness from presenting relevant testimony.2 6 7 Similarly, the Court
has recognized the fundamental right of an accused to present witnesses
in his or her own defense.268  Recognizing that criminal defendants'
rights must at times "'bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in
the criminal trial process,' "I" the Rock majority held that state rules
"may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are
designed to serve. In applying its evidentiary rules a State must evaluate
whether the interests served by a rule justify the limitation imposed on
the defendant's constitutional right to testify. ' 270 In this case, the de-
fendant's right to testify outweighed Arkansas' interest in excluding po-
tentially unreliable evidence obtained through hypnosis.
Although the Court upheld the defendant's right to testify in this
case, the decision is not a ruling on the reliability of hypnosis. Justice
Blackmun's opinion acknowledged that "scientific understanding of the
phenomenon and of the means to control the effects of hypnosis is still in
its infancy." '27 1 The Court recognized the dangers of suggestibility, con-
fabulation and "memory hardening" inherent in the use of hypnosis.
272
However, despite these dangers, the Court held that Arkansas was not
justified in excluding the hypnotically refreshed testimony of the
defendant:
Wholesale inadmissibility of a defendant's testimony is an arbi-
trary restriction on the right to testify in the absence of clear
evidence by the State repudiating the validity of all post-
hypnosis recollections.... [I]t has not shown that hypnotically
enhanced testimony is always so untrustworthy and so immune
to the traditional means of evaluating credibility that it should
disable a defendant from presenting her version of the events
for which she is on trial.
273
In particular, the Court commented on the existence of corroborating
Mississippi law did not permit the impeachment of one's own witnesses. Id. at 292-93. The
United States Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling, id. at 303, holding that the state
rules of evidence denied the defendant his right to due process of law. Id. at 295.
266. 107 S. Ct. at 2710-11.
267. Id. at 2711; see Washington, 388 U.S. at 23.
268. 107 S. Ct. at 2711; see also Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302; Washington, 388 U.S. at 19.
269. 107 S. Ct. at 2711 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)).
270. 107 S. Ct. at 2711.
271. Id. at 2714.
272. Id. at 2713.
273. Id. at 2714.
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evidence to support the defendant's posthypnosis memory.274 Arkansas'
per se exclusion "operate[d] to the detriment of any defendant who un-
dergoes hypnosis, without regard to the reasons for it, the circumstances
under which it took place, or any independent verification of the infor-
mation it produced." 2" While the Court did not endorse the general use
of hypnosis as an investigative tool, 2 76 it found the criminal defendant's
constitutional right to testify to be superior.
c. the dissent
The dissent by then Justice Rehnquist favored the right of states to
establish their own evidentiary rules, allowing such rules to take prece-
dence over the constitutional right to testify. The dissent found that
"[the Supreme Court of Arkansas' decision was an entirely permissible
response to a novel and difficult question. '277 Justice Rehnquist sup-
ported the state supreme court's exclusion of the defendant's testimony,
noting that the "advancement of the truth-seeking function of Rock's
trial was the sole motivation behind limiting her testimony. ' 278 The con-
stitutional right to testify is subject to reasonable restrictions, justifying
the state court ruling.
The Constitution does not in any way relieve a defendant from
compliance with 'rules of procedure and evidence designed to
assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt
and innocence.' Surely a rule designed to exclude testimony
whose trustworthiness is inherently suspect cannot be said to
fall outside this description.279
The dissent accepted the Arkansas court's resolution of the issue, con-
cluding that "until there is a much more general consensus on the use of
hypnosis than there is now, the Constitution does not warrant this
Court's mandating its own view of how to deal with the issue."28
d. the future use of hypnosis by a criminal defendant
While Rock did little to resolve the issue of the reliability of hypno-
274. Id.
275. Id. at 2712.
276. Id. at 2714.
277. Id. at 2716 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
278. Id. at 2715 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 2716 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi. 410 U.S. 284,
302 (1973)).
280. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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sis as an investigative tool,28" ' the Court found that a state's per se exclu-
sion of hypnotically refreshed testimony must not interfere with the
defendant's constitutional rights. As the Court in Chambers warned, the
rules of hearsay should not be "applied mechanistically to defeat the ends
of justice." '282 So too must the potential unreliability of hypnosis be bal-
anced against the criminal defendant's right to present a defense. Thus,
lower courts must decide the admissibility of a criminal defendant's hyp-
notically refreshed testimony on an ad hoc basis, at times demanding
admissibility even though the reliability of the evidence is in question.
Rock does not, however, permit the testimony of a previously hyp-
notized defendant in every case. The majority opinion rested on consti-
tutional grounds which favored the admissibility of the defendant's
testimony in this case and not the advocacy of hypnosis as a means of
refreshing memory. The potential violation of a criminal defendant's
constitutional rights may not always permit the compromise of the
state's legitimate interests.283 To the contrary, the defendant's due pro-
cess rights are not absolute284 and must be weighed against the interests
281. See infra text accompanying notes 288-96 for a general discussion of the influence of
Rock on the use of hypnosis in criminal trials.
282. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.
283. Id. at 295.
284. This notion has been recognized in the context of a previously hypnotized criminal
defendant seeking to offer exculpatory statements made while under hypnosis. See Greenfield
v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D. Va. 1976). In Greenfield, the defendant testified at trial
that he had become unconscious during the crucial moment when the murder was allegedly
committed. Id. at 1116. Shortly after his arrest, however, the defendant had confessed to the
police, indicating that he injected heroin and took hallucinogenic drugs on the night in ques-
tion. Id. at 1117. Prior to trial, the defendant was hypnotized by a psychiatrist for purposes of
enhancing his memory of the night of the murder. Id. Defense counsel requested that the
psychiatrist be allowed to question the defendant on the stand while in a hypnotic trance. The
lower court did not permit this procedure and refused to allow the psychiatrist to testify to the
defendant's statements made while under hypnosis. Id. The defendant was convicted and
sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. Id. at 1118. In denying the defendant's writ of
habeas corpus, the court noted that no evidence existed to support the reliability of the state-
ments made by the defendant while under hypnosis. Id. at 1120. Further, no additional eye-
witnesses to the crime were presented and only "minute evidence" exculpated the defendant.
Id. In upholding the trial court's refusal to permit the testimony of either the defendant or the
psychiatrist, the court noted:
This court knows of no rule that requires a judge to accept evidence of uncertain
value to go to a defense that is otherwise completely uncorroborated. The mere fact
that a crime has no eyewitnesses or direct evidence does not warrant a court to ac-
cept evidence that may be able to tell the trier of fact something about the crime, but
may also be of dubious quality. As a constitutional principle then, this court simply
finds that petitioner's due process guarantees were not abrogated by the trial court's
refusal to permit the defendant to relate his story under hypnosis or an expert witness
to recount what the defendant told him while under hypnosis.
Id. at 1120-21; see also State v. Atwood, 39 Conn. Supp. 273, 284, 479 A.2d 258, 264-65 (1984)
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of the state to ensure the "'integrity of the fact-finding process.' ,281
The reliability of the evidence presented by the defense must be
carefully considered, just as is the evidence offered by the prosecution.
2 86
However, courts should favor a more liberal standard of admissibility
when the exclusion of evidence would impede a criminal defendant's con-
stitutional right to present his or her defense. Rock confirms this unique
position held by criminal defendants and assures the future protection of
a defendant's constitutional rights even in light of the use of hypnosis.
287
C. The Influence of Rock v. Arkansas on the Use of
Hypnosis in Criminal Trials
Rock v. Arkansas2 8  should not be construed as dispositive on the
issue of hypnosis289 because the case involved the unusual situation in
(defendant's due process right to testify in own behalf was not affected by inadmissibility of
testimony elicited by hypnosis or narcoanalysis).
285. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295 (quoting Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969)).
286. The United States Supreme Court has indicated that the reliability of evidence must be
weighed against the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. See, e.g., United States v.
Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121, 1126-27 (1986) (declarant's unavailability is not requirement for admis-
sion of hearsay statements of co-conspirator); Chambers, 410 U.S. at 299-300 (reliability of
excluded hearsay weighed in favor of defendant's right to present evidence); Mancusi v.
Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213-14 (1972) (hearsay statements of unavailable witness must bear suffi-
cient indicia of reliability to be admissible); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970) (hear-
say statements of unavailable witness must bear sufficient indicia of reliability to be
admissible).
287. Under the Court's reasoning in Rock, the protection of the constitutional rights of the
criminal defendant should allow for the introduction of testimony of previously hypnotized
defense witnesses as well. This result is commanded by the compulsory process clause of the
sixth amendment which gives the criminal defendant the right to obtain witnesses in his or her
favor. See supra note 240. Yet, just as the Court indicated that Rock's constitutional right to
testify was subject to reasonable restrictions, so too would the hypnotically refreshed testimony
of defense witnesses be subject to scrutiny. In fact, the introduction of testimony of a previ-
ously hypnotized defense witness may meet greater resistance than the situation in which the
defendant him or herself testifies posthypnotically. See infra note 295.
288. 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987).
289. While Rock is the first United States Supreme Court case to consider its reliability, the
issue of hypnosis was previously raised before the Court in Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556
(1954). Although Leyra involved the unusual situation in which the defendant allegedly con-
fessed while under hypnosis, this case provides an excellent illustration of the power of hyp-
notic suggestion and its potential for abuse.
The defendant in Leyra was a 50-year-old man charged with the hammer murders of his
parents. Id. at 556-57. The defendant was subjected to constant questioning, beginning on the
evening his parents' bodies were discovered and continuing shortly after the defendant at-
tended their funeral, allowing the defendant only a few hours of sleep. Id. at 558-59. During
the interrogation, the defendant was suffering from an acute sinus attack, and was promised
that a doctor would tend to him. A "Dr. Helfand" was sent to see the defendant. However,
Dr. Helfand was not a medical doctor, but was a psychiatrist with extensive knowledge in
hypnosis. Id. at 559. Rather than render medical assistance, the doctor spent an hour and a
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which the defendant, rather than a victim or prosecution witness, volun-
tarily submitted to hypnosis. The Court in Rock rendered a very narrow
interpretation of the use of hypnosis, providing for the utmost protection
of the constitutional right to testify in spite of the use of hypnosis in an
accused's defense.290 Both the majority and the dissent acknowledged
the dangers associated with the use of hypnosis.29' The difference in the
two opinions lies in the value accorded the constitutional rights of the
accused. Thus, aside from the unusual case in which the procedure is
utilized by a criminal defendant, the use of hypnosis as a method of re-
freshing recollection remains unresolved. How will the Court consider
the use of hypnosis by the prosecution?
The five justices in the majority in Rock found that "[t]he use of
hypnosis in criminal investigations ... is controversial, and the current
medical and legal view of its appropriate role is unsettled." 292 Since the
ruling of the majority rested on constitutional grounds rather than on the
reliability of hypnosis, these five votes would not be bound to permit the
introduction of hypnotically enhanced testimony in all cases. If the
Court was presented with the more typical case of the prosecution intro-
ducing such testimony, these five justices may vote to exclude the evi-
dence without being inconsistent with Rock since the constitutional
issues involved in the prosecution's use would differ from that of the
half persistently asking suggestive questions "to break [the defendant's] will in order to get him
to say he had murdered his parents." Id. The defendant was physically and emotionally ex-
hausted and repeatedly complained of his fatigue. Id. at 560. Eventually, the defendant ac-
cepted the suggestion of the doctor and eventually agreed that he must have committed the
crime using the hammer. Id. at 562-84 (appendix to the opinion of the Court). The defendant
then confessed to the police captain and to two assistant state prosecutors. Id. at 560-61. At
his subsequent trial, the defendant argued that he had been hypnotized by the psychiatrist.
The jury found that he had not been hypnotized and sentenced the defendant to death on the
basis of his confessions. The appellate court reversed, finding defendant's confession to have
been coerced in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. People v.
Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 365, 98 N.E.2d 553, 560 (1951). On remand, defendant was again con-
victed. 347 U.S. at 561.
The Supreme Court reversed Leyra's conviction, concluding that his confession was co-
erced in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 561-62. "We hold that use of confes-
sions extracted in such a manner from a lone defendant unprotected by counsel is not
consistent with due process of law as required by our Constitution." Id. at 561.
For a general discussion of the use of hypnosis on criminal defendants, see Comment,
Hypnosis of the Accused: Defendant's Choice, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 995 (1984).
290. Note also that the dissenting opinion by Justice Rehnquist similarly avoids the resolu-
tion of the use of hypnosis in criminal trials. The dissent instead focuses on the right of the
state to determine the admissibility of questionable evidence, which takes precedence over con-
stitutional considerations. 107 S. Ct. at 2715 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
291. Id. at 2713-14, 2715-16 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 2713.
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criminal defendant. Thus, on constitutional grounds, the Rock decision
is not binding on the prosection's use of hypnosis.
In the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun touched upon the possi-
bility of reducing the dangers of contamination through the use of safe-
guards, as well as through such traditional methods of evaluating
testimony as corroborating evidence, cross-examination, expert testi-
mony and cautionary instructions.293 Although the majority opinion did
not advocate the use of this procedure as a forensic tool, the recognition
of these prophylactics suggests that a per se exclusion of posthypnosis
testimony is unwarranted. Rather, the Court seems to lean toward a case
by case evaluation of hypnosis-including those cases involving the use
of hypnosis by the prosecution-until the area is more clearly defined.
Rock's four dissenters concluded that the Constitution does not
mandate an ad hoe approach to determining the admissibility of hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony. Rather, according to the dissenters, lower
courts should be given great deference in determining their own stan-
dards of admissibility. 9 a Since the dissent found that no constitutional
issue existed, the reasoning by these four justices may presumably apply
to the use of hypnosis by the prosecution or the defense. The conserva-
tive members of the dissent suggest that their opinion was not influenced
by the fact that Rock involved a criminal defendant attempting to intro-
duce hypnotically refreshed testimony on her behalf.295 Rather, the dis-
sent relied on the right of lower courts to resolve the issue within the
parameters of the constitution. Should the Court be faced with the use of
hypnosis by the prosecution, the dissenters are bound by their opinion in
Rock to favor the state's resolution of the issue, whether a state follows a
rule of admission or exclusion.
293. Id. at 2713-14.
294. Id. at 2716 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
295. A further issue may exist when a defense witness, not the defendant, submits to hypno-
sis prior to trial. The Court in Rock recognized the California Supreme Court's decision in
People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 723 P.2d 1354, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 458 U.S. 860,
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982). The Shirley court excluded all testimony of a previously
hypnotized prosecution witness, noting the constitutional implications of the use of hypnosis
by a criminal defendant:
[W]hen it is the defendant himself-not merely a defense witness-who submits to
pretrial hypnosis, the experience will not render his testimony inadmissible if he
elects to take the stand. In that case, the rule we adopt herein is subject to a neces-
sary exception to avoid impairing the fundamental right of an accused to testify in his
own behalf.
Id. at 2712 n.15 (quoting People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 67, 723 P.2d 1354, 1384, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 243, 273, cert. denied, 458 U.S. 860, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982) (citing People v.
Robles, 2 Cal. 3d 205, 214-15, 466 P.2d 710, 716, 85 Cal. Rptr. 166, 172 (1970))). The United
States Supreme Court's opinion in Rock did not address the issue of admissibility of pos-
thypncsis testimony of witnesses other than criminal defendants. 107 S. Ct. at 2712 n.15.
HYPNOSIS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
The possiblility exists, however, that the potential unreliability of
hypnosis as a means to refresh recollection influenced the four dissenters
even more strongly than the absense of a constitutional right to testify. If
so, a future case involving the use of hypnosis by the prosecution may
meet opposition from some members of the dissent based on the unrelia-
ble nature of the evidence. Without a more clear indication regarding
the basis for the dissenters' votes, a possibility remains that the use of
hypnotically refreshed testimony by the prosecution may be excluded as
being too unreliable.
As noted above,2 96 the use of hypnosis by the prosecution does not
raise the same constitutional issues that were at issue in Rock. Clearly,
the admission of testimony of a previously hypnotized witness is not con-
stitutionally mandated, particularly in light of its questionable reliability.
Without the demands of constitutional guarantees to warrant the admis-
sibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony, the Court is not likely to
commit to any per se rule of admission or exclusion. Whether the per-
suasion of the Rock majority or dissent is controlling in a case in which
the prosecution introduces hypnosis as part of its case, the use of hypno-
sis by the prosecution must continue to be questioned.
V. CONCLUSION
What happens when the black letter of the law confronts the black
art of hypnosis? At this point, the question remains unresolved. While
hypnosis seemingly represents a method for the discovery of truth, its
potential unreliability signals that it may nonetheless provide an inappro-
priate basis for a verdict against a criminal defendant. Until there is con-
clusive evidence establishing the accuracy of hypnosis as a method of
refreshing recollection, the use of hypnosis in a criminal trial must be
cautiously approached and seriously questioned.
Both the admission and exclusion of hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony is subject to criticism. Traditionally followed methods of deter-
mining the admissibility of this testimony must be reevaluated, taking a
critical look at the potential impact of hypnosis on a witness' testimony
as well as the influence of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Through the
use of evidentiary objections for excluding unreliable evidence, courts are
provided with additional ammunition for keeping misleading testimony
of a previously hypnotized witness from the trier of fact. Absent specific
legislation governing the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testi-
296. See supra notes 153-237 and accompanying text.
January 1988)
700 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:635
mony in a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence will at least pave the
way to more proper methods of excluding such testimony.
Additional problems of a constitutional dimension cast doubt on the
admissibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony. The dangers inherent
in the hypnotic session present the possibility that the admission of hyp-
notically obtained testimony may deny a criminal defendant the constitu-
tional rights to confrontation of witnesses and due process of law. On
the other hand, excluding such testimony could potentially cripple law
enforcement, which has found hypnosis to be an invaluable investigative
tool. If the police were prevented from using hypnosis upon the slightest
possibility that the witness will be called upon to provide testimony in a
subsequent criminal prosecution, crucial evidence could be lost. The reli-
ability of such testimony must be carefully considered in each case, rec-
ognizing both the special protections reserved for criminal defendants as
well as the interests of the state in seeking a just verdict.
The use of hypnosis has the potential to forever influence the mem-
ory of the subject, as well as alter the course of the criminal trial in which
it is used. While the truth determining process may be best served by
liberal standards of admissibility, the criminal justice system must recog-
nize the unique dangers presented by the use of hypnosis, particularly
when hypnotically refreshed testimony forms the basis for a verdict
against a criminal defendant. Until the trustworthiness of forensic hyp-
nosis is established, the law must exercise caution, lest the system of jus-
tice also falls prey to the mesmerizing powers of the unconscious mind.
Lisa K Rozzano*
* The author wishes to thank Professors Stanley A. Goldman and Victor J. Gold of
Loyola Law School for their guidance and assistance throughout the preparation of this Com-
ment and Clint Miller, Assistant Attorney General for the State of Arkansas, for his insight
and information.
